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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is currently under-investing in the human capital
of its children. This significant investment deficit threatens both our
children's vitality and the nation's ability to compete in a knowledge-
based economy. At all income levels, investment in children-in educa-
tion, housing, training, and nutrition-has significant long-term bene-
ficial returns for both the recipients of the investment and for society as
a whole. This Article proposes that the nation shift the focus of its
current fiscal policies towards human capital investment in children.
This Article advocates a self-sustaining investment program that delivers
resources directly to children and that children are required to repay
when they start working. It relies on the economic literature on human
capital, the educational literature on the impact of money on childhood
attainments, and the political theory literature on civic responsibility to
helpj ustify the self-sustaining investment program implemented through
the tax code. This Article seeks to promote new ways of evaluating our
current programs and policies and to facilitate further discussion about
a child-centered investment strategy.
Politicians generally agree that helping our children is an important
national priority. While some policies and reforms have proved bene-
ficial, the path policyrnakers are currently taking to improve the lives of
children is inadequate. Over one fifth of the population of children is
poor or near poor, yet Congress continues to under-fund programs that
invest in children and to reduce funding for many of the safety net
programs specifically designed to ensure that children remain out of
poverty.1
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1. Over 16.2 million children, 22.3% of the total population of children, live in poverty or near
poverty, and of that 22.3%, 6.9 0 live in severe poverty. BERNADETrED. PROCTOR &JOSEPH DAIAKER,
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2002, at 12 (U.S. Census Bureau, Pub. No. P60-222, 2003), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-222.pdf Near poverty is defined as people with incomes
under 125/o ofthe poverty threshold. See id at 9. Severe poverty is defined as families with incomes below
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The decision about how heavily to invest in children affects far more
than simply those children who live in poverty. At all income levels,
investment in children-in education, housing, training, and nutrition
-has significant beneficial returns for both the recipients of the invest-
ment and society as a whole.2 Children in low, moderate, and upper-
income families all benefit from increased investment in their human
capital. With the exception of families with extremely high incomes,
families from a broad range of socioeconomic classes struggle to provide
their children with adequate child care, health care, housing, and educa-
tion.'
Despite fairly strong evidence that investing in human capital will
produce beneficial results, the United States has failed to invest ade-
quately in children. During the past 20 years, and especially in the last
10 years, the United States has relied heavily on tax cuts and market
mechanisms to create economic incentives for families with children.
Because many of the children most in need of investment live in low- or
moderate-income families, tax cuts and market mechanisms often leave
them behind. Tax cuts for education, which are designed to increase
halfofthe poverty threshold. Id at 9. In 2002, the severe poverty rate for a head of household with two
children would be $7,247. See id. at 4. The poverty rate is not adjusted geographically, so families in high
cost areas may be significantly worse off than the statistics indicate. Some scholars have argued that the
poverty rate is not the right measure ofpoverty and that it underestimates poverty. See Robert Greenstein
et al., Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Bearing Most ofthe Burden: How Defleit Reduction During the 104th
Congress Concentrated on Programsfor the Poor (Nov. 26,1996), available at http:/ /www.cbpp.org/ 104TH.HTM;
DonaldJ. Hernandez, Pover , Trends, in CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR 18 (GregJ. Duncan &
Jeanne Brooks-Guno eds., 1997). This level of poverty is not an inevitable result of the capitalist system.
The poverty rate in the United States is significantly higher than Canada, the United Kingdom, or
Germany. See MICHAELJ. GRAETZ &JERRY L MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN
SOCIAL INSURANCE 117-18(1999). For a study of poverty rates among various industrialized countries see
UNICEF: INNOCENTI RESEARCH CENTRE, A LEAGUETABLE OF CHILD POVERTY IN RICH NATIONS 17
(2000) (finding the United States was one of the worst performing countries with the second to highest
poverty rate of the 23 countries surveyed).
2. See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 109 (3d ed. 1997); SUSAN E. MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY:
FAMILY INCOME AND CHILDREN'S LIFE CHANCES 110 (1997) ("increasing housing environment index by
a standard deviation increases four- and five-year-olds' PPVT [Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test] scores
by 2.16 points"); THEODORE W. SCHULTZ, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF EDUCATION 53, 65 (1963)
[hereinafter SCHULTZ, VALUE OFEDUCATION] (human capital investment through education); Theodore
W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1-17 (1961) [hereinafter Schultz, Human
Capital] (discussing health,job training, and education as forms ofhuman capital investment); see also infia
note 17.
3. See ROBERT J. MILLS & SHAILESH BHANDARI, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2002, at 2 (U.S. Census Bureau, Pub. No. P60-223,2003) (indicating that 7 million
people with income over $75,000, almost 7 million with incomes between $50,000 and $75,000, and over
14.5 million with incomes between $25,000 and $50,000 were without health insurance in 2002), available
athttp://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-223.pdf. For a look at middle-class families with no health
insurance, see Stephanie Strom, For Middle Class, Healh InsuranceBecomes a Luxu~y, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2003, § 1, at 33.
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investment in children, barely help middle-income families and are of
no help to poor families who pay little or no income tax.
Furthermore, although there is a significant economic benefit both for
individuals and society in investing in children, the market will not, and
cannot, supply the needed investment. Children are too much of an
investment risk. Banks have little or no certainty of repayment and can-
not take a security interest in a child's future.4 But if investing in child-
ren now will produce positive returns in the future, then some type of
mechanism should exist to provide the needed investment. In many
ways, children are like start-up companies seeking venture capital. They
are a risky investment, but the potential rewards from success are very
great. A venture capitalist knows that many of his investments will not
succeed, but also knows (or at least hopes) that some will hit thejackpot.
He is willing to take on a risky investment because the potential returns
from the investment are great.
In this Article, I propose a program designed to shift the focus of our
current fiscal policies towards investment in children.' I advocate a
federal investment program that delivers resources directly to children
and that children are required to repay when they start working.6 The
program will create Child Investment Funds to provide every child
under the age of 15 with a yearly cash payment of approximately
$2,000.
I focus on investment payments directly to children for two main
reasons. First, if the payment is made directly to children, and the pay-
ment belongs to the children, there is a greater chance that the funds
will be invested in the child.' Second, recent programs providing
4. BECKER, supra note 2, at 291 ("poor families often have difficulty financing investments in
children because loans to supplement theirlimited resources are not readily available when human capital
is the collateral."); DANIEL SHAVIRO, Do DEFIcriS MATrER? 154-57 (1997) (discussing argument that
parents might increase investment in child's education if parent could share in the benefits).
5. See Aletha C. Huston, Children in Poverty: DwveopmentW andP/iylssnes, in CHILDREN IN POVERTY:
CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 1,4 (Aletha C. Huston ed., 1991) (noting that most discussions
regarding possible solutions to children's poverty center on influencing adults).
6. The basic payback, which is discussed in more detail in Part IV.A infra, requires children (as a
group) to pay back the amount they received plus interest. Because I assume that general tax revenues will
increase because ofwage growth, I use an interest rate tied to the inflation rate. Thus, children need to pay
back what they received in inflation-adjusted dollars, but they are not required to pay market rate interest.
See EDWARD F. DENISON, TRENDS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWVTH 1929-1982, at 15 (1985) (finding
that education per worker accounted for 16% of growth in output in nonresidential business); KJELL A.
CHRISTOPHERSEN & M. HENRY ROBISON, STATE OF ILLINOIS, THE SOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS
GENERATED BY 39 COMMUNrIY COLLEGE DISTRICTS IN ILLINOIS 1 (2002) (finding that taxpayers receive
13 .8% return on their annual investments in community colleges), availabk at http://www.iccb.state.il.us/
HTMIL/pdf/econimpact/92002lllinoiAggFinalES.pdf.
7. There is, for example, no requirement that parents invest the Child Tax Credit, the Earned
Income Credit, or amounts saved from the Dependency Exemption on their child. See I.R.C. § 24 (West
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assistance to families with children often include significant restraints on
parental behavior, and families can lose essential benefits when parents
run afoul of these controls. This loss of benefits significantly impacts a
family's ability to invest in its children. This child-centered program
reorients attention away from punishing parental behavior and towards
investing in children.8
At first, a program that provides cash payments directly to children
may seem like a radical proposal. However, it will become clear that
this approach is not so radical after examining the program in light of
the economic literature on human capital theory and the educational
literature on childhood attainments. Moreover, the nation's current
policies to provide subsidies to children or families, and other proposals
to provide such assistance, also allow the reader to evaluate the
feasibility of this proposal. Additionally, examining current policies
through the lens of human capital theory and investment in children will
shed new light on those policies.
The model I propose is at least partially based on the rational econo-
mic choice a child would make in the marketplace if he or she were
able. Rational lower-income or middle-income children would often
choose to borrow money now to invest in their own human capital.
Poor children clearly would borrow money now to ensure that they had
adequate food and shelter. As we have seen with student loans, middle-
class children routinely borrow money to invest in their education. The
problem here is that without intervention the market will not make
many of these loans. The risk of default is simply too great absent an
extremely large pool of borrowers and an easy systematic way of
collecting.9
This Article presents a road map for creating a permanent self-
sustaining program to close the investment gap facing our children. No
2002 & Supp. 2004) (Child Tax Credit); id § 32 (Earned Income Credit); id § 152 (dependency exemp-
tion).
8. Since the purpose of this proposal is to provide human capital investment to all children, the
program is not means tested and is available to all children. In addition, the benefit is available to the child
regardless of a guardian's behavior or actions. Even ifone concludes that punitive measures are appropriate
to encourage welfare recipients to get off welfare or to discourage drug use, punitive measures towards
children ofthose recipients are not appropriate. The three-year-old child of a welfare mother did nothing
to deserve his or her poverty and certainly did nothing to warrant the removal of benefits, but it is the child
who likely will suffer the most from the elimination of welfare benefits. As discussed in Part IV.A.2 infia,
my proposal contains safeguards to ensure that unfit parents have no control over the child's payment. In
this regard, the proposal helps shift our current focus away from normative judgments about parental
behavior.
9. See BECKER, supra note 2, at 291; GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 247-48 (1991)
[hereinafter BECKER, FAMILY]; Lynn A. Stout, Some Thoughts on Poverty and Failure in the Marketfor Children's
Human Capital, 81 GEO. Lj. 1945, 1947 (1993) (finding that the market for "children's human capital may
be rife with imperfections" that encourage under-investment in children).
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initial project can, or should, address all the technical questions, con-
cerns, or objections that a program of this magnitude necessarily raises,
and no author can create a perfect plan. I hope that this project will
encourage people to examine our current programs and policies in a
new way and will open a dialogue for further discussion about a self-
sustaining child-centered investment program.
Part II examines the economic problems facing children in the United
States and explains why the proposed program is necessary. In present-
ing the basic theory behind the program, Part II relates my proposal to
the economic literature on human capital, the educational literature on
the impact of money on childhood attainments, and the political theory
literature on civic responsibility. Part III consists of a brief description
of existing subsidies to children or families with children and presents
programs and policy ideas that can be drawn upon for guidance in
creating a self-sustaining investment program for children. It also
examines current policies and programs through a lens of investment in
children. In Part IV, I detail my proposal for investment assistance to
children-a universal cash assistance program with a commensurate
payback. This Part also addresses alternative models including a volunt-
ary program with more risk-based financing and a direct loan approach
that allows each person to take out a government-backed human capital
loan. Part IV also responds to some of the concerns and criticisms that
will be raised regarding my proposal.
II. ECONOMIC, EDUCATIONAL, AND POLITICAL THEORY
ARGUMENTS FOR INVESTING IN CHILDREN
The country is failing its children. The current political and econo-
mic climate in the United States has left millions of children behind,
with substandard child care, health care, housing, education, and train-
ing.' ° The problem ofunder-investment in children is not, however,just
a problem for poor children. As education, health care, housing, and
child care costs rise, more families are finding it harder to make ends
meet and to provide adequately for their children." A recent report by
10. See MILLS, supra note 3, at 2 (8.5 million children have no health insurance); FED. INTER-
AGENCY FORUM ON CHILD AND FAMILY STATISTICS, AMERICA'S CHILDREN: KEY NATIONAL
INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 2003, at 19,92 (2003) (finding that, in 2001,36% of U.S. households with
children had one or more indicators of housing problems-physically inadequate housing, crowded hous-
ing, or housing that cost more than 30% of household income), available at http://www.childstats.gov/
ac2003/pdf/ac2003.pdf; id. at 49, 115 (44% ofchildren age 3 to 5 do not participate in early childhood
care and educational programs).
11. See MARK LINO, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN BY FAMILIES, 2002,
at ii (2003) (discussing the costs of raising children), available at http://www.usda.gov/cnpp/crc/
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the U.S. Department of Agriculture indicates that a middle-income
family with two children and a household income of $52,900 will spend
almost $20,000 per year on their children.' 2
The problem of inadequate investment in children impacts the child,
his or her family, and society as a whole. Children cannot learn if they
are hungry, malnourished, or in unstable environments. 3 A child's
potential is not recognized if he must forgo further education because it
is too expensive or inaccessible.
This Part considers the theoretical and policy justifications for a self-
sustaining child investment program. First, it discusses the economic
theory and principles that indicate investing in the human capital of
children is an economically wise proposition. It is not only essential for
the child to succeed in an ever transforming knowledge-based economy,
but it is also necessary for society to continue to grow and prosper as the
economic climate in the United States is transformed from a manufac-
turing economy to a skills-based economy. Second, this Part addresses
some of the societal justifications and theories for an investment pro-
gram, and third, it examines political theories that should encourage
investment programs aimed at children.
A. Economic Jistfications for Investing in Children
The consequence of under-funding investment in children is that the
human capital of the next generation suffers. In their groundbreaking
work starting in the 1960s, Gary Becker and Theodore Schultz, working
separately in a series of articles, formalized the human capital theory in
economics.' 4 This theory provides the basis for understanding why
crc2002.pdf; CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK, STARTING POINTS: MEETING THE NEEDS OF
OUR YOUNGEST CHILDREN (1994) (discussing high cost of quality child care); see also COLLEGE BOARD,
TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2004 (n.d.) (discussing the increase in college pricing and its affordability),
available at http://www.collegeboard.com/research/home/; TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE
MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000) (discussing the economic stress facing middle class families);
ELIZABETH A. WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP- WHY MIDDLE-CLASS
MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE(2003) (noting two-incomc families are barely meeting their
basic expenses).
12. MARK LINO, supra note 11, at ii (families with incomes less than $39,700 spend approximately
$7,080 per child, families with incomes between $39,700 and $66,900 spend approximately $9,660 per
child, and families with incomes over $66,900 spend approximately $ 14,133 per child).
13. Shahin Yaqub, Poor Children Grow into PoorAdult: HasmfulMechanisms or O'er-Detennistic Theory?,
14J. INT'L. DEV. 1081, 1084 (2002) (reviewing findings of other scholars and concluding that poor
nutrition impacts attention spans, motivation, memory, and school attendance).
14. BECKER, supra note 2; SCHULTZ, VALUE OF EDUCATION, supra note 2; Schultz, Human Capital,
supra note 2.
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investment in children is necessary and why such investment is bene-
ficial to people throughout the socioeconomic scale.
1. Overview of Human Capital Theory and Investing in Children
Human capital theory recognizes that people are themselves capital.
Just like plant and equipment, personal attributes and skills create value-
added capital that is used to increase personal output. In a series of
lectures and articles, Becker and Schultz developed and analyzed the
different types of investments that increase human capital. Principally,
Becker and Schultz recognized that education and training provide sign-
ificant increases in human capital and significant increases in income. 5
On a simple level, this can be seen by analyzing the median wage by
educational attainment. In the United States in 2002, the median wage
for someone who had not completed high school was $19,205, for high
school graduates was $26,795, for college graduates it was $50,623, and
for people with professional degrees it was $101,375.6 Although esti-
mates vary, it has generally been found that the return on a person's
investment in education exceeds ten percent.
17
Similar conclusions regarding the benefits of investment in human
capital were reached with regard to training and health care.'8 Ob-
viously, someone who is sick and cannot work or someone who is
trained only for menial work will have difficulty earning a decent wage.
A similar problem exists for children in poverty, whose human capital
is being destroyed by inadequate nutrition, housing, education, and
health care.
15. SCHULTZ, VALUE OF EDUCATION, stpra note 2, at 46, 53,65; Theodore W. Schultz, Reetions
on Investment in Man, 70J. POL. ECON. 1 (1962); see also Orley Ashenfelter & Cecilia Rouse, Schooling, Intelli-
gence, and Income in America, in MERITOCRACY AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 89 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds.,
2000) (recognizing and rejecting the argument that "[e] ducation does not generate higher incomes; instead,
individuals with higher ability receive more education and more income").
16. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS AND BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY: ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY (March Supp. 2002), availabLe at http://ferret.bls.census.gov/
macro/032002/perinc/new04_001 .htm.
17. Orley Ashenfelter & Alan Krueger, Fstimates of the Economic Return to &hoolingfrom a .lew Samrple
of Twins, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1157, 1157 (1994) (finding that "an additional year of schooling increases
wages by 12-16 percent"); Ashenfelter & Rouse, supra note 15, at 92 (estimating a 10% return on investing
in education); see also BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL, supra note 2, at 7; SCHULTZ, VALUE OF EDUCATION,
supra note 2, at 62; CHRISTOPHERSEN & ROBISON, supra note 6 (students have a 26 .l1 % rate of return on
their investment in college). See generally GEORGE PSACHAROPOULOS & HARRY ANTHONY PATRINOS,
RETURNS TO INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION: A FURTHER UPDATE (World Bank Policy Research, Working
Paper No. 2881, 2002) (discussing the issue of and reviewing the return to investment in education in
various countries); OECD, EDUCATION AT A GLANCE: OECD INDICATORS 2002, at 124-25 (2002)
(There is a strong positive correlation between educational attainment and earnings.).
18. Schultz, Human Capital, supra note 2, at 9-10.
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What human capital theory indicates is that people with less invest-
ment in human capital generally will make less money and be less
successful. Greater investment in human capital should lead to a better
trained and educated work force that is more productive and better able
to earn a liveable wage. In the current economic environment, how-
ever, there is an investment gap. Poor and middle-class parents often
need to spend most of their money on current consumption and thus
have less money to invest in their children's human capital. 9 So even
though investment in human capital will pay long-term dividends (at
least for their children), parents may not be making the investment
because their economic survival takes precedence over investing in their
children.
In some cases, there is an under-investment in a child's human capital
because a parent needs the money for economic survival. In other
cases, there may be under-investment due to current consumption pre-
ferences by the parent. In light of the above, a rational child, or at least
a rational child with advice from a rational adult, would choose as much
investment in education, training, food, and health as was possible based
on his economic situation.20 We see that today as students attempt to
obtain higher education even as the cost of education rises. Students
consistently borrow large sums of money betting on the human capital
theory of economics. They are betting that the large debt they are
taking on is worth it, because their future wages will be sufficient to
cover the debt burden. In most cases, this is a sound decision by
students.
It also would be rational for a young child to borrow money to ensure
he was adequately clothed, fed, and housed. He could predict that by
investing in himself now he would be better able to learn in school, have
less chance of dropping out, and have a higher chance of success. Of
course, there are not student loans for young children, 1 but as I propose
19. Mary Corcoran & Terry Adams, Race Sex, and the Intergenerational Tranrmission of Poverty, in
CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR, supra note 1, at 462; see BECKER, FAMILY,supra note 9, at 5,244-
47, 302 (Parents must allocate between children's human capital and current consumption.).
20. BECKER, FAMILY, supra note 9, at 244 (discussing human capital investment for children, Becker
argues that the proper level of investment would assume that parents can maximize the welfare of their
children by borrowing whatever is necessary to maximize the net income of their children).
21. We do, of course, have public education. As a society, we recognize the importance of investing
in the human capital of children by publicly financing public schools. Although the system of financing
public education has its own serious problems, public education is designed to ensure that all children have
at least a basic level of education. Public schools also highlight the problem of inadequate investment in
children, as the quality of public education varies dramatically by the economic demographics of a
particular area. Children in poorer demographic areas often receive lower-quality education, further
stratifying the different levels of human capital investment.
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here, it might be appropriate to provide human capital loans for young
children.
22
2. Empirical Evidence Supporting Human Capital
Investment in Children
Empirical evidence supports Becker and Schultz's hypothesis that
investment in human capital will pay dividends, 23 but the focus of most
of that research has been on adults.24 Scholars in education, however,
have examined the impact that income and poverty have on a child's
ability to achieve. Combining human capital theory with their research,
it is clear that increased income allows families to invest more in their
children and results in higher educational attainment and a lessening of
other risk factors.
For example, recent studies indicate that poverty in childhood
adversely impacts a child's ability to achieve and that persistent poverty
is particularly harmful.25 Poor children are more likely to have to repeat
a grade, to drop out of high school, and to have out of wedlock births.26
In addition, children living in poverty are more likely to experience
22. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL, supra note 2, at 291 ("poor families often have difficulty financing
investments in children because loans to supplement their limited resources are not readily available when
human capital is the collateral. Such capital market restrictions lower investments in children from poorer
families.").
23. BECKER, HUMAN CAPIrAL, supra note 2, at 161-251. See generally Jacob Mincer, On the job
Training: Costs, Returns, and&me Implications, 70J. POL. ECON. 50 (1962) (ob training and human capital);
Burton A. Weisbrod, Education and Investment in Human Capital, 70J. POL. ECON. 106 (1962) (discussing
human capital investment in education); SelmaJ. Mushkin, Health as an Investment, 70J. POL. EcON. 129
(1962) (argues that investing in health is an investment in human capital).
24. See supra note 23; see also Huston, supra note 5, at 4-6.
25. See Thomas L. Hanson et al., Economic Resources, Parental Practices, and Children's Well-Being, in
CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR, supra note 1, at 190 (reviewing the literature and finding that
children from "economically disadvantaged families exhibit lowerlevels of physical development, cognitive
functioning, academic achievement, self-esteem, social development, and selfcontrol than do children from
more advantaged families"); see also GregJ. Duncan &Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, Family Povery, Welfare Re fon
and Child Development, 71 CHILD DEV. 188, 188 (2000) [hereinafter Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, Family Povery]
(concluding that "deep or persistent poverty early in childhood affects adversely the ability and achievement
of children"); GregJ. Duncan et al., EconomicDeprivation and Early ChildhoodDevelopment, 65 CHILD DEV. 296,
296 (1994) (even accounting for other differences between low and high-income families, family income
and poverty strongly correlate with cognitive development); Glen H. ElderJr. et al., Linaing Family Hardship
to Children's Lives, 56 CHILD DEv. 361 (1985); GregJ. Duncan, The Economic Environment of Childhood, in
CHILDREN IN POVERTY: CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 5, at 40-46 (finding that
poverty has a negative impact on child attainments); CRAIG T. RAMEY & FRANCES A. CAMPBELL, Povery,
Early Childkod Education, and Academic Competence: The Abecedarian Experiment, in CHILDREN IN POVERTY:
CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 5, at 190, 218-19 (finding that early childhood
interventions significantly increase child attainments).
26. Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, Family Poverty, supra note 25, at 188.
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abuse, neglect, and violent crime.27 Alternatively, studies indicate that
there is a correlation between increasing income and increasing child-
hood attainments.28
Some have argued that the culture of poverty, not income per se,
creates these poor outcomes.29 But in recent work, Greg Duncan and
Jeanne Brooks-Gunn have attempted to isolate income from other
factors. They found that family income has a significant effect on child-
ren's attainments. Importantly, they found that family income has a
strong impact on verbal ability and achievement and less of an impact
on behavior or physical health. Moreover, they found that "being poor
in all of the first four years of life is associated with about a nine point
difference in Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence
(WPSSI) IQtest scores at age 5, compared with not being poor in those
years."'" They also found that the depth of poverty was important and
that children below the poverty line had test scores significantly lower
27. Id.
28. H. Elizabeth Peters & Natalie C. Mullis, The Roe ofFamily Income and Sources ofincome in Adolescent
Achievement, in CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR, supra note 1, at 340, 365-66, 376 ("increases in
income at all levels of socioeconomic status improves outcomes").
29. See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 9 (1984); Mayer, supra note 2, at 14-17
(concluding that once basic necessities are met, increased income does not significantly benefit children);
LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NON-WORKING POOR IN AMERICA 5,15
(1992) (arguing that non work by the poor is the greatest social problem); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND
ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 37-41 (1986) (arguing that the impact of
generous social benefits was to generate dependency on government).
30. Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, Family Poverty, supra note 25, at 188-89 (poverty adversely impacts the
ability and achievement of children); Hanson, supra note 25, at 190 (finding that income generally increases
children's welfare); Peters & Mullis, supra note 28, at 376 (1997) (higher level of family income positively
associated with outcomes for teens); see also Robert Haveman & Barbara Wolfe, TheDeterminants ofChildren's
Attainments: A Review ofMethods and Findings, 33J. ECON. LIT. VOL. 1829 (1995) (discussing the benefits to
children from increased human capital investment); Cororan & Adams, supra note 19, at 461 (noting that
"[c] onsiderable research.. .has documented an association between fathers' incomes and sons' earnings");
WILLIAM H. SEWELL & ROBERT M. HAUSER, EDUCATION, OCCUPATION AND EARNINGS: ACHIEVE-
MENT IN THE EARLY CAREER 108 (1975) ("parents' average income.. . has the largest effect on earnings
... of all the variables in the model"); OECD, supra note 17, at 99 (differences in socio-economic status
are associated with large differences in reading literacy). But see David M. Blau, The Effect of Income on Child
Development, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 261 (1999) (finding that the effect of temporary increases in income
on cognitive development is small, and the effect of permanent increases is larger, but still small); Yaqub,
supra note 13, at 1081, 1086 (2002) (noting that there is a correlation between a parent's income and the
ultimate income ofthe child, and that the earnings advantage ofwell-offparcnts is similar to the advantages
gained through higher education); DavidJ. Zimmerman, Regression TowardMediel in Economic Stature, 82
Am. ECON. REV. 409,410 (1992) (finding strong correlation between father's earnings and son's future
income); Gary Solon, IntergerationalIncomeMobii_ in the UnitedStates, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1992) (find-
ing the same correlation); D. O'NEILL & 0. SWEETMAN, THE PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY IN BRITAIN:
EVIDENCE FROM PATTERNS OF INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY 2, (Nat'l U. oflr., Econ. Dep't, Working
Paper N6 1/10/95, 1995) (finding that in the United Kingdom a" I % increase in fathers' earnings increases
sons' earnings by .6 %").
31. Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, Famniy Poverty, supra note 25, at 189.
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than children who had family incomes above the poverty line. 32  In
addition, Duncan and Brooks-Gunn found that young children's out-
comes were particularly sensitive to family income.3" Greater family
income during a child's younger years significantly increased the child's
chances of graduating from high school. 4
A recent study by Eric Turkheimer found that almost 60 percent of
the variance in IQ for low-income individuals is the result of their
environment and almost none of the variance is due to heredity.35 This
means that intervening in a low-income child's life can have a significant
positive impact on IQ Increasing a child's IQ increases the chances
that the child will succeed economically and decreases the chances that
the child will end up in poverty.
3. Money Matters
What emerges from an examination of the economic literature on
human capital theory and the education literature on childhood attain-
ments is the conclusion that money matters. Children in families with
32. Id
33. It is for this reason that I advocate giving money directly to children during their early
childhood. Other proposals, like the Stakeholder Society or Human Capital Accounts, discussed infia Part
III.B. 1, provide benefits to children only after they reach adulthood. In my view, this assistance reaches
them too late.
34. Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, Farnily Poverty, supra note 25, at 189.
35. Eric Turkheimeret al., Soioeconomic Status ModifsHeritabi!0yoflQin roung Chidren, 14 PSYCHOL.
Scl. 623 (2003); see also Peters & Mullis, supra note 28, at 376 (finding that "[flor most outcomes the income
effect was close to linear, so poverty is not a special case: increases in income at all levels ofsocioeconomic
status will improve outcomes"). But see MAYER, supra note 2 (finding that increased income is only
beneficial for extremely low-income families); RICHARDJ. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL
CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 10-11 (1994) (arguing that IQ is
mostly hereditary); CLAUDE S. FISCHER ET AL., INEQUALITY BY DESIGN: CRACKING THE BELL CURVE
MYTH 22-69 (1996) (disputing Herrnstein and Murray's findings and concluding that intelligence is not
fixed at birth).
36. There is significant disagreement regarding the impact IQ has on job performance and
economic success and a thorough review of this literature is outside the scope of this Article. I only argue
that increasing a child's IQis one factor that will increase the child's ability to succeed. For a discussion
of the impact IQhas on job performance, see HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 35, at 70-79, 165
(arguing that there is a link between higher IQandjob performance and employment); Frank L. Schmidt
et al., Personnel Selection, 43 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 627,654-60 (1992). But see Fischer, supra note 35, at 97-
101 (criticizing Herrnstein and Murray's analysis and concluding that intelligence explains approximately
10% of the variance in incomes); Juop Hartog, On Human Capital and Individual Capabilities, 47 REV. OF
INCOME & WEALTH, 515, 535 (2001) (ability has a significant correlation with earnings, but IQis a bad
measure of ability); John Crawley et al., Three Observatsons on Wages and Measured Cognitive Ability, 8 LAB.
ECON. 419, 433 (2001) (cognitive ability accounts for small variance in wages); see also Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971) ("The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and
general testing devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas ordegrees as fixed measures of capability.").
UNIVERSITY OF CLACIANA TI IA WREVIEW [Vol. 73
higher incomes do better. 7 They have higher graduation rates, higher
incomes, and fewer behavioral problems. One explanation for these
better outcomes is that people with higher incomes have greater
resources available to invest in their children's human capital. Higher
income people can afford to purchase higher quality day care, to pro-
vide better nutrition for their children, and to live in better neighbor-
hoods.38
The education literature indicates that a child's performance and IQ
can suffer due to consistent poverty and that childhood educational
attainments are affected by the quality of the child's neighborhood,
education, and health care. The economic literature indicates that
children in general benefit from increased human capital investment.39
As the knowledge-based economy becomes more dependent on skilled
workers, human capital investment in the next generation becomes
essential for fulfilling the goal of having an educated and skilled work-
force.
B. Civic Responsibiliy and Benefits
Although a self-sustaining investment program in children can be
justified purely on economic theory, it also finds strong support in social
welfare theory. This section examines social welfare justifications for
supporting a child investment program. The first part of this section
examines the theories based on the justification that assistance to
children increases societal well-being, the second part examines
individualistic justifications for investment in children, and the third
section examines theories ofjustice and fairness. The first two sections
primarily rely on Michael Graetz and Jerry Mashaw's recent work
examining justifications for a social safety net. The third section
37. Seesupra note 30.
38. Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, Famiy Poverty, supra note 25, at 190; IJAMFSBROOKS-GUNNETAL.,
NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY: CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES FOR CHILDREN (1997). But see
HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 35, at 127-42 (arguing that IQis a greater indicator of future poverty
than economic status); O'NEILL, supra note 30, at 18 (finding that even adjusting for ability "has little
impact on the persistence of poverty across generations").
39. Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, Family Poverf,, upra note 25, at 188-89; see SCHULTZ, VALUE OF
EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 53 ("differences in the amounts invested in human capital in workers may be
the single most important factor accounting for differences in wages"). See generally BECKER, supra note 2.
Although in developing the argument here I rely on studies and literature involving human capital
investment, this Article is not attempting to prove that increased investment in the human capital of
children is beneficial. I leave that to others far more qualified in the field. Instead, this Article assumes that
increased human capital investment is beneficial and is designed to discuss a creative way of increasing the
current level of investment.
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examines the implications of Rawls's theory of social justice for a self-
sustaining investment program for children.
Graetz and Mashaw's and Rawls's arguments are particularly
persuasive when applied to children.40 Children are not in a position to
help themselves. They cannot lift themselves up by their own boot-
straps.
1. Societal MaximizationJustification
In their recent book, True Security, Rethinking American Social Insurance,
Graetz and Mashaw use the story of the three pigs to set out several
reasons why society should provide a social safety net.4' These argu-
ments basically break down into two groups. The first is social maxi-
mization or charitable justification, and the second is the individual
maximization. Under the social maximization theory, society itself
benefits from the social program. For example, when there is a market
failure, the government may step in to correct for inequities or to pro-
vide support that reduces the harsh consequences that may result when
the market is unwilling or unable to provide the necessary insurance.42
Under this approach, Graetz and Mashaw argue that government has
an obligation to correct for inequities in the market or at least reduce the
harsh consequences that may result from market failure.
In the context of investing in children, one can see a type of market
failure. Children are not able to enter into market transactions or
obtain human capital loans even though investing in human capital is
a wise investment. As a society, it is reasonable to attempt to create
social programs to correct for this market failure. This is especially true
when considering investments for children because it appears that the
market failure is creating an aggregate reduction in societal wealth.
Thus, by correcting for the market failure society is actually better off.
Society also may recognize that inefficiencies in the market cause an
unequal distribution of income, or that some members of society are not
well-equipped to operate in a competitive arena. In this regard, society
may wish to provide food to the poor, subsistence-level income assis-
tance, or economic assistance to people who are disabled. Society meets
this obligation for charitable reasons, but also because society receives
40. As Graetz and Mashaw explain, "[tihe core difficultly in delivering adequate social insurance
protection to children is that the virtually universal desire to help these children is accompanied by
suspicion of, and sometimes even antipathy toward, their parents." GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 1, at
114.
41. Id. at 15-23.
42. Id. at 17-19.
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benefits from its benevolence.4 3 Because society will likely not make this
contribution absent a societal benefit, the aggregate benefits to society-
including the goodwill that society feels by being charitable-must out-
weigh other costs to society. Thus, a social safety net may increase
society's well-being and wealth."
2. Individualistic Maximization
The second group of justifications for a social safety net involves
individualistic maximization. An individual may realize that providing
a social safety net is necessary for his own benefit. Graetz and Mashaw
refer to this as self-regard.45 Absent a safety net, the poor may want
something from me; family members may want to stay in my house;
poor people may ask me directly for charity. Instead of being accosted
by homeless on the street, one might prefer to fund homeless shelters.
Under this justification, society creates a safety net because doing so is
in the best interests of its individual members.
In addition, some scholars argue that societal stability depends on
those at the bottom having sufficient economic well-being that they
choose to at least accept the status quo.i In this regard, an individual
may prefer to "subsidize" poor people to ensure that they accept current
societal norms that benefit the particular individual. Chaos or public
unrest by those with no economic stake in society poses a direct threat
for those individuals who benefit from the current social structure.
43. Id at 17-21.
44. For a general discussion of social insurance, see GEORGE E. REJDA, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND
ECONOMIC SECURITY (1988).
45. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 1, at 19.
46. Id at 18-19 (discussing reasons for social insurance including fairness, obligation and selfregard);
see Colin Wringe, Children's Wefare Rights are Entitlements, in VISIONS OF ENTITLEMENT, THE CARE AND
EDUCATION OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 31, 41 (Mary A. Jensen & Stacie G. Goffin eds., 1993) (A rational
actor would not enter society and give up his or her freedoms to be worse off than he would be outside
society. We, therefore, must assume that members ofsociety make a trade-offand surrender part of their
freedom and accept obedience to the law in exchange for some benefit. If no benefits result, the individual
would be better offliving outside society and not in accordance with its rules.) Wringe further argues that
requiring the poorest in society to obey the law comes with a concurrent societal obligation to protect them
from extreme poverty. Id; see also Peter Edelman, 7he Next Centuy ofOur Costitution: Reinking Our Lul to
the Poor, 39 HASTINGS LJ. 1, 2, 23 (1987) (arguing that there should be a constitutional right to some form
of minimum income or subsistence level assistance).
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3. Justice and Fairness Rationale
In Theo
, 
of Justice, John Rawls outlines an additional reason for
providing a social safety net47 and urges society to create and impose a
system that is just and fair.48 He argues that such a system must be
determined in the "original position,"4 9 which assumes that people do
not know their ultimate place in society and are forced to make deci-
sions behind a "veil of ignorance."50 They do not know their social
class, economic status, education, or intelligence. They could be born
rich or poor, intelligent or not-intelligent. Because of the uncertainty as
to one's position in society, Rawls argues that a rational actor would
choose a social safety net that at least provided minimal economic pro-
tection for the poor. After all, under Rawls's theory, that person could
end up poor without the mental acumen to succeed.5'
4. Impact of Analyses of Civic Responsibility on
Investment in Children
Investment in the human capital of children has both individualistic
and societal benefits. Society benefits from a more educated, trained,
and self-sufficient citizenry. 2 It would therefore be unfair and inefficient
to require all social welfare policies to pay for themselves, or for all pro-
grams that invest in children to be paid for by the recipients. The dual
benefits derived from investing in children indicate that there should be
a dual role in funding these investments. Because I endorse thisjustifi-
cation, I do not suggest that society should reduce existing funding for
47. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 17 (1971). For a discussion of Rawls's theory of social
justice, see generally WILL KYML1CKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION
(1990).
48. RAWLS, supra note 47, at 17. For a discussion of Rawls' theory in the context of child welfare
assistance, see Edward B. Foley, Socialjustice and ChildPovey, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 485,490-93 (1996). See also
Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributivejustice and Limitations on Taxation: What Rawls Denandsfiom Tax Systems, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 1991 (2004) (discussing Rawls's theory as applied to taxation).
49. RAWLS, supra note 47.
50. Id at 17-19.
51. For an argument that economic welfare and security are a component of citizenship, see T. H.
MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 10-11 (1950). See also Martha T. McCluskey, Effwiency and
Social Citizenship: Challngi theNeoliberalAttack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783,790-97 (2003) (analyzing
Marshall and arguing that society cannot be just unless all its citizens have economic and political security);
CITIZENSHIP TODAY: THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF T. H. MARSHALL (Martin Bulmer &
Anthony M. Rees eds., 1996) (discussing Marshall's theory in light of contemporary welfare questions).
52. Providing assistance to children, either through income assistance or other programs helps stop
poverty and can be justified by the human capital theory of economic growth. Yaqub, supra note 13;
OECD, supra note 17, at 136-37 (Human capital investment significantly contributes to strong economic
growth and has both social and individual returns.).
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children's programs. Nothing I advocate here suggests that government
should stop funding day care, Head Start, or food stamps in exchange
for the Child Investment Funds. In fact, if anything, this discussion
makes clear that government is not doing enough. Similarly, I do not
advocate elimination of tax benefits that indirectly help children, includ-
ing the child tax credit, the Earned Income Credit, or the dependency
exemption.
Investing in children, however, provides a specific benefit to the child
as well as to society as a whole. If a child is better educated and earns
a higher income, the child is a direct beneficiary of that investment. It
is therefore appropriate to require that child, or at least the aggregate of
all children who receive a benefit, to contribute or pay back some of the
money he received for investment.
Recently, Amy Wax has argued that current trends in social policy
are centered on helping those who are willing to help themselves and
that what she terms "social reciprocity" is an essential component of
government assistance programs.53 Work requirements in recent welfare
legislation are just one example. Although a child investment program
can be justified on civic responsibility grounds alone, the Child Invest-
ment Fund program I propose attempts to bridge the gap between those
who support pure subsidy programs and those who advocate social
reciprocity or market mechanisms for increasing investment in children.
As discussed and developed in Part IV, I advocate a cash assistance pro-
gram for children with a commensurate payback by the child once the
child is employed.
C. Public Choice Theogy and Correcting the Funding Bias Against Children
Anotherjustification for a self-sustaining investment program in child-
ren is that children are powerless to influence the legislative process and
are under-represented in the political arena. Children cannot lobby, do
not contribute to political campaigns,54 and cannot represent themselves
53. See, e.g., Amy L Wax, A Recprocal Welfare Program, 8 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L 477 (2001) (arguing
that "social reciprocity" is an important ingredient in government assistance programs); Amy L. Wax,
SomnethingforNodang Liberal-ustice and Welfare Work Requirements, 52 EMORY LJ. 1, 2-3 (2003) ("conditional
reciprocity" requires individuals, if they are able, to contribute to society in some way as a quid pro quo
for assistance); Peter B. Edelman, PrmotWng Family by Promoting Work- The Hole in Martha Freeman's Doughnut,
8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L 85,88-89 (2000) (arguing that work outside the home is important
but those jobs must be available and pay a livable wage).
54. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), prohibited children under 17 from
making political contributions. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441k (West 2003 & Supp 2004). In McConnell v. FEC, the
Supreme Court overturned this restriction. 540 U.S. 93, 231-32 (2003). Major contributions from
children, increase the parent's influence in the political process, not the child's. See McConnell v. FEC, 251
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in the political process. Interested adults have formed organizations to
lobby for children, and parents often represent their children's interests,
but these organizations cannot adequately represent children's interests.
The political incentive to under-invest in children and over-spend on
adults is supported by public choice theory.5 Public choice theory
examines the legislative process and government decision making
through the lens of economic theory and models. 6 The premise is that
government spending is an economic good and that interest groups will
compete to obtain the good for themselves. Thus, groups with greater
influence will be able to obtain a bigger piece of the pie."7
Although the public choice approach has been rejected by some scho-
lars,"S it is generally because the theory does not fully explain legislators'
actions, not because it is wholly irrelevant. 9 Public choice theory tends
to minimize a legislator's own political agenda, views, and morals. It
treats our public officials as indifferent actors ready to be bought and
sold. Although this may be public perception, it is certainly question-
able based on the literature.6°
The public choice model, however, does provide some insight into the
legislative process. People who vote, organize, and are wealthy have
greater ability to influence legislation. The public choice model requires
society to recognize, or at least examine, whether the political process
is biased against children. As the population ages and fewer families
F. Supp. 2d 176, 588 (D.D.C. 2003) (discussing concerns by the FEC and others that parents were giving
contributions in their children's names, and noting that large donations have been made by 4 year olds).
55. See Stout, supra note 9, at 1956 ("A primary obstacle to optimal social investment in children is
the fact that the principal beneficiaries of such investment are disenfranchised.").
56. For a discussion of Public Choice Theory, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,JR. ET AL. & PHILLIP P.
FRICKEY, CASESAND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATIONOF PUBLIC POLICY
54-60(2001). Se also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULIsM: ACONFRONTATION
BETWEEN THE THEORYOF DEMoCRACYAND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1988); Gary S. Becker,
A Theoy of Competition Among Pressure Groupsfor Political Influence, 98 Qj. ECON. 371, 371 (1983).
57. See Susan A. MacManus, Taxing and Spending Politics: A Generational Perspecwe, 57J. POL. 607, 619
(1995) (finding less support among older people than younger people for increased funding in public
education).
58. Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated
by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L REV. 1, 6-9 (1990) (arguing that public choice theory fails to
adequately explain the legislative process); see also Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, TheJurispudence
of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873-74(1987) (noting public choice theories are insufficient to explain the
legislative process); Joseph P. Kat & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideologv in the Economic Theoy of Politics, 74
AM. ECON. REV. 279 (1984) (economicjustification of legislative action is not a good predictor of legislative
outcomes).
59. Shaviro, supra note 58, at 76 ("[O]ne should not conclude from the theory's failure here that it
lacks significant explanatory power. It needs to be supplemented, not abandoned."); see also id at 75-106
(discussing problems with public choice theory and the ways it can be improved).
60. Kalt & Zupan, supra note 58.
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have children, public choice theory indicates that children will receive
a smaller and smaller piece of the pie.6 Not only will children get a
smaller portion, but the federal deficit incurred through other people's
success in obtaining the pie will be borne disproportionately by them.6 2
A self-sustaining investment program ensures that children will at least
receive a basic level of investment in their human capital.
III. LESSONS FROM CURRENT AND PROPOSED PROGRAMS FOR
CREATING A SELF-SUSTAINING CHILD INVESTMENT PROGRAM
At first, the idea of providing cash assistance directly to children may
seem outlandish. Nevertheless, current programs indicate that creating
a self-sustaining investment program in children is not so radical a pro-
posal. Subsection A examines existing programs and policies that pro-
vide subsidies to families with children and discusses how these existing
programs confirm the plausibility of a self-sustaining child investment
program. Subsection B reviews other policy proposals designed to
increase assistance to families with children, or to increase investment
in children, and explains how the program I suggest incorporates or
benefits from these prior policy initiatives.
61. The number of families with children has dropped from 55.9% in 1970, to 52% in 1980, to
48.9% in 1990, to 48.1% in 2000. Author's calculations based on U.S. Department of Education, National
Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 2001, at 25 (2002), availabk at
http://nces/ed/gov/programs/digest/do2/tables/dto.18.asp. See MacManus, supra note 57, at 619
(finding spending preferences are closely linked to the "expected priorities ofpeople at that point in the life
cycle").
62. For a thorough discussion of budget deficits and intergenerational transfers, see SHAVIRO, supra
note 4, at 140-44; LaurenceJ. Kolikoff, From Deficit Delusion to the Fscal Balance Ru-k Looking for an
Economically Meaningrul Way to Assess Fiscal Policy, in GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING AROUND THE WORLD
9 (AlanJ. Auerbach et al. eds., 1999). In his most recent discussion on the topic, Daniel Shaviro notes that
the George W. Bush Administration's policy of cutting taxes and increasing spending further exacerbates
problems of inter-generational transfers. See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, RECKLESS DISREGARD: THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY OF CUTTING TAXES IN THE FACE OF AN ENORMOUS FISCAL GAP (Center
for Law and Business Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. CLB 03-19, 2003). This large increase
in the budget deficit obviously impacts the ability of the government to fund the program I suggest in the
short tern. It also highlights the importance of the program I propose. The current tax cuts and spending
increases benefit this generation at the expense ofthe next. If we are going to saddle future generations with
more and more debt, we should at least provide those generations with sufficient human capital investment
to pay those debts.
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A. Current Programs and Subsidies Indicate that a Self-Sustaining Child
Investment Program is Workable
1. Social Security
a. Social Security Retirement Benefits
In many ways, the funding for the Child Investment Fund program
works like Social Security but in reverse. Under Social Security, current
workers pay a wage tax, and the proceeds from the tax are credited to
the Social Security trust fund.63 Current retirees, who presumably con-
tributed to the fund while they were working, receive a Social Security
benefit from the fund. The working population funds the benefits paid
to the retired population. It does so with the hope that the next genera-
tion will work and pay into the system to honor promises made to it.
Thus, each generation funds the previous generation's benefits. Social
Security beneficiaries receive cash benefits, and except in extreme cases,
the recipients are free to spend the money as they choose.6 4 In large
part because of Social Security, the poverty rate among the elderly has
dropped dramatically.65 If we are willing to provide a safety net for
adults who presumably had a lifetime to plan for retirement, why not
have a similar program for children?
As discussed in more detail in Part IV, I propose a program for child-
ren that is funded in a manner similar to Social Security, with one sub-
stantial difference-a payback requirement. Social Security provides
benefits to one generation and expects the next generation to fund these
benefits. There is a disconnect between the beneficiaries and the contri-
butors. Under my proposal, each generation receives a benefit and then
is required to pay back that benefit during its working life. The entire
cohort will receive a certain benefit, and that cohort must pay back the
amount received. There is no attempt to shift the burden of the pay-
back on other generations. Just as under the Social Security system,
some will receive more and some less than they ultimately will have to
pay back, but the cohort as a whole will pay back what was received.
63. I.R.C. § 3101 (West 2002 &Supp. 2004).
64. 42 U.S.C.A §§ 301-1397jj (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
65. The poverty rate for people over 65 has dropped from approximately 35.2% in 1959 to 10.4%
in 2002. See PROCTOR & DALAKER, supra note 1, at 28; see also Robert B. Hudson, 7he Histoy and Place of
Age-Based Public Policy, in THE FUTURE OF AGE-BAS ED PUBLIC POLICY 2 (Robert B. Hudson ed., 1997);
Eric R. Kingson &James H. Schulz, ShouldSoial ScurilyBeMans-Testd?, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21 ST
CENTURY 52 (Eric R. Kingson &James H. Schulz eds., 1997).
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b. Social Securiy Sunivor Benefits
The Social Security system is a model for the suggested program in
a second way. Social Security includes a program that provides cash
benefits directly to children. Children whose parents are deceased,
retired, or disabled are entitled to Social Security benefits.66 These
benefits belong to the child. The Social Security Administration (SSA)
reports that it distributes approximately $1.6 billion each month to
almost 3.8 million children."
Because the child is not able to make financial decisions for herself,
the Social Security Administration appoints a "representative payee"
who controls the money on the child's behalf.6' The representative
payee is usually a parent or guardian who has custody of the beneficiary,
and the SSA has specific regulations for determining who should be ap-
pointed as the representative payee69 if such a parent is not available or
appropriate.70 The representative payee receives the money on behalf
of the child and must use the payments for the benefit of the child.7
The representative payee is required to submit a statement to the SSA
explaining how the money was spent. 2 The SSA has authority to in-
vestigate abuse by representative payees, but the SSA does not exercise
direct oversight regarding how the money is spent.73 The SSA may re-
66. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (2000).
67. Social Security Administration, Benefitsfor Children, SSA Pub. No. 05-10085 1 (March 2001),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs.
68. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1383(a) (2003 & Supp. 2004); 20 C.F.R. § 416.610 (2004) ("When payment will
be made to a representative payee.").
69. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.620 (indicating the factors the SSA uses to choose a representative payee,
including the relationship to the beneficiary, the amount of interest the person shows in the beneficiary,
legal authority the person or entity has to act on child's behalf, whether the person has custody over the
child, whether the payee is in a position to know and look after the beneficiary); id § 416.621 (b) (indicating
order ofpreference for selecting a representative payee for beneficiaries under age eighteen).
70. Id § 461.621 (b) provides that SSA's preference in choosing a representative payee are as follows:
(1) parent who has custody, (2) parent who does not have custody but provides support, (3) parent who does
not have custody and does not provide support but has demonstrated "strong concern" for the beneficiary,
(4) a relative or stepparent who has custody of the beneficiary, (5) a relative who does not have custody but
who contributes towards the beneficiary's support, (6) a relative or close friend who does not have custody
but who demonstrates concern for the beneficiary's well being, and (7) an authorized agency or institution.
71. Id § 416.635(a).
72. Id § 416.635(c).
73. Social Security recommends that the benefits should first be used to pay for the day-to day needs
of food and shelter for the beneficiary, and then may be used for the beneficiary's personal needs. The
benefits may also be used to pay for medical needs not covered by insurance. Se SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, PUB. No. 05-10076, SOCIAL SECURrrY: A GuIDE FOR REPRESENTATIVE PAYEES 3
(2001), anvailable at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/ 10076.pdf.
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move a representative payee who abuses her position,74 and a repre-
sentative payee may be liable to the beneficiary for misspent funds.
7 5
2. Alaska's Permanent Fund
Another program that provides an example of cash assistance to
children is Alaska's "dividend" program.76 Alaska currently provides a
dividend from its oil revenues to all qualifying residents." Children as
well as adults qualify for the dividend,78 and over the last five years
dividend payments per person have averaged almost $1,650 per year.79
Alaska distributes the dividend through the Alaska Department of
Revenue.
80
What is instructive about the Alaska system is that Alaska routinely
pays a cash dividend to children in an amount and form similar to what
I propose here. The Alaska program provides support for the notion
that a Child Investment Fund could be both feasible administratively
74. 20 C.F.R. § 416.650.
75. See id § 416.641; SocIAL SEcuRrrY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 73, at 2.
76. Alaska's constitution provides that 25% of the royalties Alaska receives from oil and mineral
leases be placed in a permanent fund. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 15. By statute, Alaska has increased the
25% contribution to 50%. 2003 ALASKA SESS. LAWS ch. 22 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 37.13.010(a)(2)
(Michie 1997)). The permanent fund is designed to be a savings account for the state, and the funds may
not be spent absent a constitutional amendment. Id. Alaska statutes also provide for inflation protection
for the fund. ALASKA STAT. § 37.13.145(c) (Michie 1997). The idea ofthe permanent fund is that Alaska
can save for the future so that when its natural resources dwindle it will have self-sustaining financial
reserves. The investment returns from the fund may be appropriated by the legislature. The legislature
has determined that a portion of those returns should be distributed to the citizenry as a "dividend." The
amount of the dividend is provided by a statutory formula. Sem id § 43.23.025.
77. Alaska Statutes § 43.23.005 provides that a person is eligible for a dividend if he is a state
resident, applies to the department, was a state resident during the entire qualifying year, was in the state
for at least 72 consecutive hours, and is a citizen of the United States or an alien meeting certain specific
criteria. An individual is not entitled to a dividend even if the person meets the above criteria if, during the
relevant year, the person was incarcerated due to 1) a felony conviction, or 2) a misdemeanor conviction
and had been previously convicted of either a misdemeanor or a felony. See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(d).
78. Alaska Statutes § 43.23.005(a) provides that any person who applies for a dividend, is a state
resident, and was a state resident during the entire qualifying year is entitled to a dividend. Alaska Statutes
§ 43.23.005(c) provides that a parent or guardian may claim a permanent fund dividend on behalf of a
minor, and that minors who do not meet the residency requirement are eligible for a dividend if "during
the two calendar years immediately preceding the current dividend year, the minor was born to or adopted
by an individual who is eligible for a dividend for the current dividend year." The statutory framework
ensures that all children who are residents of Alaska, or who were recently adopted by or born to, residents
of Alaska qualify for the dividend.
79. 2002 PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND ANN. REP. 6, available at http://www.pfd.state.ak.us.
80. For further information on the Alaska Permanent Fund and the dividend program, see
ROOGNVALDUR HANNFESSON, INVESTING FOR SUSTAINABILUTY: THE MANAGEMENT OF MINERAL
WEALTH 57 (2001); William S. Brown & Clive S. Thomas, The Alaska Permnanat Fund- Good Sense or Political
Expedienqy?, 37 CHALLENGE 38 (1994); J. PatrickJ. O'Brien & Dennis Olson, The Alaska Permanent Fund and
DizidendDisribution Program, 189 PUB. FIN. Q. 139 (1990); see also Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation Web
site, available at http://www.apfc.org.
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and successful programmatically. For example, there appears to be no
evidence of a huge upsurge in fertility in Alaska, nor does the dividend
payment appear to discourage work or encourage alcoholism or drugs.
Alaska's cash dividend payment program provides an interesting
example of a statutory framework for how a national program might
deliver cash assistance to children. Under Alaska law, a parent may
claim a permanent fund dividend on behalf of a minor by submitting an
application to the Department of Revenue.8' The dividend, however,
is the child's and the parent's right to receive the dividend is based on
whether the child qualifies for the dividend. Surprisingly, there are no
statutory rules regarding a parent's duty to the child recipient with
regard to the dividend payment.82 Alaska law gives the parent tre-
mendous leeway to use the child's dividend payment as the parent
chooses. In fact, relying on general common law principles, the Alaska
Supreme Court indicated that one of the "'parental rights' protected by
the constitution [is] 'the right to control and manage' a minor child's
earnings and property." 3 Although the court has held that a parent has
a right to control a child's dividend, it is unclear whether such control
allows the parent to take ownership of the dividend, or whether the
parent has some duty to the child with regard to the dividend. Con-
cluding that a parent has "'the right to control and manage' a minor
child's earnings and property" is not the same as holding that the parent
may use the child's money for the parent's own benefit. It may be that
the parent has control over the money but still has some duty to ensure
that the child receives the benefit of the dividend.
Despite the fact that the parent has control over the dividend, the
dividend clearly belongs to the child. A parent who fails to make an
application for an eligible child may not make one retroactively.84 The
child, however, is allowed to make an application on her own behalf
when she reaches age 18, and is entitled to any dividends not previously
paid to her due to the parent's failure to make an application.85 More-
over, the United States treats the dividend payment as taxable income
to the child.8 6 If parents had complete control over the child's per-
81. ALASKA STAT. §§ 43.23.005, 43.23.015.
82. See Lawson v. Reynolds, No. S-10053, 2002 WL 1486484, at *9 (Alaska, July 10, 2002)
(indicating that "[i]n Alaska the law is silent regarding a parent's responsibilities once a child's PFD is
distributed").
83. See id; Lec v. Cox, 790 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Alaska 1990) (quoting L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827,
832-33 n.13 (Alaska 1976)).
84. SewALASKAADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.133.
85. ALASKA ADMN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.133(b).
86. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OFTREASURy, PUB. 3328, CAT. No. 26988N, HOWTO
FILE YOUR CHILD'S 2001 TAX RETURN: INFORMATION FORPARENTS OFALASKAN CHILDREN 1 (2002),
available at http://www.uncefed.com/IRS-Forms/2002/p3328.pdf.
478
2004] LVVEST1.NG 1N CHILDREN
manent fund dividend, including the right to spend the child's dividend
on themselves, the parent, not the child, would be subject to federal tax
on the dividend.87 Finally, even Alaska recognizes that the child's
permanent fund dividend is not the parent's property because the divid-
end is not included in the custodial parent's income when calculating
that income for purposes of child support and alimony.
88
There are no Alaska cases reporting disputes between parents and
children regarding ownership or custodianship of the dividend. 9 Most
legal disputes concerning a minor's dividend payment involve parents
fighting over which parent should receive the child's dividend or arguing
that the other parent has misspent the child's dividend.9" The Alaska
program therefore places complete trust in parents that they will use the
dividend for the child's benefit. Although this provides for administra-
tive simplicity, it fails to place any control on parental behavior.
The Alaska model gives parents too much control over the dividend
payment and treats the dividend as income support for the family. The
parents may have control over the child's funds, but if Alaska intends for
the funds to be the child's property, the parents should have some duty
to manage and control the child's funds for the child's benefit. In Part
IV, I propose that parents must have a fiduciary duty to the child with
regard to the funds, similar to the duties of a "representative payee" in
the Social Security context.
87. S&e Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (assignment of income case); Helvering v. Hoist, 311
U.S. 112, 116 (1940) (taxation may occur when taxpayer has use or control over the income).
88. See Fernau v. Rowdon, 42 P.2d 1047, 1052 n.9 (Alaska 2002) (calculating monthly income of
mother by including alimony, part-time work, and the mother's permanent fund dividend. The court did
not include the children's permanent fund dividend in this calculation).
89. See Lawson v. Reynolds, No. S-10053, 2002 WL 1486484, at *9 (AlaskaJuly 10, 2002) ("In
Alaska, the law is silent regarding a parent's responsibilities once a child's PFD [Permanent Fund Dividend]
is distributed."); Leev. Cox, 790 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Alaska 1990). ButseeChizmarv. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196,
211 n. 13 (Alaska 1995) (As part of a lawsuit against a doctor for false disclosure of an HIV test, children of
divorced couple claimed that due to the divorce they lost their permanent fund dividend. Prior to the
divorce the dividend was placed in the children's accounts for future education. The children did not
attempt to sue their parents for misuse of the dividend, but instead chose to sue the doctor.).
90. See Hayes v. Hayes, 922 P.2d 896, 897-901 (Alaska 1996) (Mother "borrowed" $4,000 from
children's dividend with an oral promise to pay the funds back. Father argued that this was an abuse and
that as part of the divorce proceeds the mother should be required to pay back the borrowed funds. The
court indicated that the transaction was between the mother and the children and that only they could
enforce the agreement. From a contract perspective, "borrowing" $4,000 from your children hardly seems
valid since the child lacks the legal capacity to contract.); Lee, 790 P.2d at 1363 (dispute over custody and
dividend); R.I. v. C.C., 9 P.3d 274, 278 (Alaska 2000) (custody dispute where court ordered that child's
dividend to be held until custody issues where resolved); Teseniar v. Spicer, 74 P.3d 910,916-17 (Alaska
2003) (parent could use the money to support herself and the child when husband failed to make full child
support payments despite agreement with former husband that she would deposit the money into an
educational account).
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3. Dependency Exemption and the Child Tax Credit
The federal tax system delivers the equivalent of cash benefits to
families with children through the Dependency Exemption and the
Child Tax Credit. This subpart discusses why the Dependency Exemp-
tion and the Child Tax Credit are subsidies to families with children.
It also discusses that, as subsidies, these benefits are misdirected toward
middle- and upper-income families and thus are inefficient mechanisms
for increasing human capital investment in children.
a. Dependency Exemption
Although the federal tax system does not provide cash assistance
directly to children, it does provide economic benefits to families with
children. First, taxpayers are entitled to a deduction of $3,100 for each
dependent.9 While the definition of a dependent is very expansive, it
generally includes children who are living with the taxpayer and who
receive more than one-half of their support from the taxpayer.92 Since
this benefit is provided as an exemption from income, it is only available
to people who have income subject to tax. Moreover, the exemption is
phased out for high-income earners, so married couples with incomes
over $336,550 do not receive the benefits of the exemption.9" The
Dependency Exemption formula thus delivers the equivalent of cash
assistance to taxpayers with annual incomes from around $20,000 to
$325,000, with the greatest benefit going to taxpayers with incomes
around $200,000. Those higher-income individuals whose income is
not quite great enough to be subject to the phase out, however, receive
the greatest benefit.94 The Dependency Exemption thus provides the
equivalent of a cash benefit to taxpayers, but it does so in a way that
provides the greatest assistance to those who may need it the least-
middle and upper-class taxpayers. It provides assistance to middle and
upper-income families because they have children, but it does not
91. I.R.C. §§ 151, 152 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004). The dependency deduction is adjusted for
inflation. See Revenue Procedure 2003-85,2003-49 I.R.B. 1184, for the inflation adjusted figures for 2004.
92. I.R.C. § 152(a).
93. I.R.C. § 151 (d)(3). See Revenue Procedure 2003-85, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1184, forinflation adjusted
figures.
94. Since the income tax system is progressive, people with higher incomes have higher marginal
tax rates. A $3,000 deduction or exemption is worth $900 to a taxpayer with a marginal rate of 30%,
because that is the amount of tax he would have had to pay on the $3,000 had he not been entitled to the
exemption. A $3,000 exemption is worth only $450 to a taxpayer with a marginal rate of 15%. The
Dependency Exemption provides a greater subsidy to taxpayers in higher brackets. Once a taxpayer's
income reaches a certain amount, however, the Dependency Exemption is phased out and that taxpayer
receives little or no benefit from the exemption. See 1.R.C. § 15 1(d)(3).
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provide assistance directly to children. It is a deduction available to
parents, and there is no requirement that the parents must spend that
money on their children.
b. Child Tax Credit
In part because of the distributional problems associated with the
Dependency Exemption, in 1993 Congress passed a Child Tax Credit.95
A tax credit is credited against the amount of tax owed, providing a
taxpayer who qualifies for the credit a dollar for dollar decrease in her
tax bill.96 So a taxpayer with a $3,000 tax liability and a $1,000 tax
credit pays a tax of $2,000. Currently, taxpayers with incomes between
$20,000 and $110,000 receive a tax credit of $1,000 per child. 7
Unlike the Dependency Exemption, the tax credit does not generally
become more valuable as income rises. All taxpayers who qualify for
the full amount of the credit receive the same benefit regardless of their
income. But once again, since the tax credit is a credit against one's tax
liability, absent a specific provision to the contrary, a taxpayer generally
must have a tax liability to receive the credit.
During the Child Tax Credit debate, there was significant discussion
whether some of the tax credit should be available to people who had
no income tax liability.98 Congress ultimately created a partially refund-
able Child Tax Credit, so that some low-income individuals receive part
of the tax credit even if they pay no federal income tax.99
95. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, (codified at 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 24(a)(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004)).
96. For a discussion oftax credits generally see DANIEL Q. POSIN& DONALD B. TOBIN, PRINCIPLES
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 633-34 (6th ed. 2003).
97. People with incomes below $20,000 and above $110,000 are subject to complicated transition
rules. People with incomes below $20,000 often have no federal income tax liability. The credit is partially
refundable to the extent of l0% of the taxpayer's income that exceeds $10,000. So a person with $11,000
in income will receive a refundable child tax credit of $100 (10% of $1 1,000-$10,000). Taxpayers with
incomes over $110,000 are subject to a phase out of the tax credit. They receive a $50 reduction in their
tax credit for every $1,000 that their adjusted gross income exceeds $110,000. For a more detailed
explanation of the transition rules surrounding the child tax credit, see POSiN & TOBIN, supra note 96, at
641-43, and Martin J. MacMahon Jr., The New Child Credits: Explainable Mechanics and Unfathomable Policy,
76 TAX NOTES 1625 (1997).
98. This is referred to as a refundable credit. It means that the credit is not just against tax. If a
credit is fully refundable, any amount of the credit not used to offset an income tax liability is still sent to
the recipient in the form of a positive payment.
99. See supra note 93. The argument by some members in Congress was that the tax credit should
be refundable because low-income people still had sizeable employment tax obligations, and thus still have
significant tax liability. The refundability amount of the Child Tax Credit for a person with three or more
children takes into account social security taxes paid. See I.R.C. § 24(d)(l)(B)(i) (West 2002 & 2004); see also
143 CONG. REC. 14,796 (1997) (statement ofRep. Stupak) (indicating that many low-income individuals
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c. The Dependency Exemption and the Child Tax Credit as Mechanisms for
Investing in Children
The Dependency Exemption and the Child Tax Credit in many ways
provide the exact type of assistance I advocate in this Article. They both
provide a cash equivalent to families based on the number of children
in the family, but both the Dependency Exemption and the tax credit
provide assistance to mainly middle-class families, and both payments
reduce the parents' tax liability. Neither payment belongs to the child
or is justified on the basis that the parents will use the money to invest
in their children. Because it delivers the benefit to parents and not
children, and mainly to middle-class families, the Dependency Exemp-
tion and the Child Tax Credit are inefficient and ineffective methods of
promoting human capital investment in children.
To the extent that the goal is to deliver cash subsidies to families with
children, instead of directly to children as I advocate, the nation should
at least deliver such assistance to people who need it most. It makes no
sense to have a cash assistance program designed primarily for the
middle class. In the recent debates in Congress regarding President
Bush's proposal to accelerate the phase-in of the Child Tax Credit, 00
some have argued that expanding the tax credit to low-income people
is welfare, as if calling it welfare clearly indicates that the payment is
improper.1 ' This fails to recognize that the current tax system provides
welfare as well-it is just welfare to the middle class.
Others in Congress argue that a tax credit or a Dependency Exemp-
tion is not welfare to the middle class as long as itis provided to people
who are already paying tax.10 2 But the fact that we provide a benefit
through the tax code in no way changes the character of the payment.' 03
pay significant social security and state and local taxes); id at 11,987-88 (statement ofRep.Jackson-Lee)
(people paying social security taxes deserve to receive the $500 Child Tax Credit).
100. The child tax credit was increased from $500 to $1,000, and the refundable amount of the tax
credit was scheduled to increase from 10% of that amount of income over $10,500 to 15% of the amount
over $10,500. The Bush proposal accelerated the amount of the tax credit but not the percentage of the
tax credit that was refundable. This meant that most low-income families received no benefit from the
acceleration of the child tax credit. See ANDREW LEE & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CENTER ON BUDGET AND
PoLIcy PRIORTrES, HOW THE NEW TAX LAW ALTERS THE CHILD TAX CREDIT AND How LOW-
INCOME FAMILIES ARE AFFECTED (2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org/5-28-03tax3.pdf.
101. 149 CONG. REG. H5321 (daily ed.June 12, 2003) (statement of Rep. Bachus) (arguing that a
refundable tax credit is welfare); id at H4963 (daily ed.June 4, 2003) (statement of Rep. Kingston) (same).
102. Id at H5321 (statement ofRep. Bachus) (stating that if you get money back that you paid, it is
not welfare).
103. See Anthony Infanti, A Credit to Their Brackets, PITTSBURGH POsT-GAZETTE,June 29, 2003, at
B2 (arguing that the recent cut in the taxable rate for dividends is equivalent to a check by the government
to corporate shareholders).
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Presumably, a tax credit or deduction that reduces revenue from the
standard tax baseline is a subsidy to the person receiving it and can thus
be termed welfare. 4 Welfare is simply a subsidy to the recipient for
their benefit. A subsidy to middle class or wealthy individuals for their
benefit is as much welfare as a subsidy to the poor. The question is
whether the tax credit and the Dependency Exemption are such a pay-
ment. If they are, is there any justification for providing welfare solely
to the middle class? If we were designing from scratch a system to pro-
vide cash assistance to families with children, we would never design one
that provided almost all the benefits to families with incomes between
$20,000 and $325,000.
d. The Dependency Exemption and Child Tax Credit Operate as Subsidies to
Families with Children and are Similar to Welfare Payments
There are several theoretical reasons why Congress might want to
provide a tax deduction or credit to families with children. First, such
a deduction might be necessary to clearly reflect a taxpayer's income.
Second, Congress might decide that the deduction is necessary based on
"ability to pay" principles. Third, Congress might want to provide a
subsidy for people with children and decide that a tax benefit is the
simplest way to reach that goal.
The first justification to clearly reflect income is the only one that
does not have a "welfare purpose." When Congressjustifies a deduction
on this rationale, it has determined that the party's income will not be
properly stated unless such a deduction is granted. A classic example of
such a deduction is section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
provides a deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses.
0 5
It would not clearly reflect a business's income to tax it on its gross
receipts, and for many businesses with small profit margins, such a tax
system would appear unfair. Allowing a business to deduct its costs
ensures that the business pays tax only on its profits. The ordinary and
necessary business deduction is therefore necessary to clearly reflect the
taxpayer's income. From this perspective, it is not welfare or a subsidy,
but instead is designed so that the entity is taxed on what is considered
to be the proper amount.
104. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 451 (1991); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of
Washington, 461 U.S. 540,547 (1983). For a discussion ofthe tax baseline and tax deductions and credits
acting as a subsidy, see Donald B. Tobin, Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, 37 GA.
L REV. 611, 643 (2003).
105. See I.R.C. § 162 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004).
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The second justification-to properly reflect a taxpayer's ability to
pay-as applied in the Dependency Exemption context is a decision by
the government to subsidize one type of activity over another. General-
ly, the U.S. tax system is based on an ability to pay principle.1"6 This
principle holds that people should pay taxes with some adjustment or
accommodation for their ability to pay. This idea forms the basis for
many of the elements of our income tax. For example, progressive taxa-
tion, which is designed to increase a person's tax burden as income rises,
and the standard deduction, which ensures that people have a subsis-
tence level of income prior to subjecting them to tax, are both based on
ability to pay principles.
The Dependency Exemption also is justified by the ability to pay
principle: if the goal is to ensure that a family is not taxed unless its
income exceeds subsistence, then some adjustment must be made for
family size. A family with four children will obviously require a higher
subsistence level than a family with no children. The Dependency
Exemption accounts for this differential and ensures that the larger
family does not pay tax until its income exceeds a higher threshold.
But the decision to include family size in the measurement of ability
to pay is a decision by the government to favor one cost over another.
It is, in a sense, a decision to subsidize a particular behavior. Recogniz-
ing this, Henry Simons, in his famous work on personal income taxa-
tion, indicated that parents made a voluntary decision to have children
and that expenses in caring for those children were consumption deci-
sions made by the parent.'07
A decision by Congress to include the number of children in the
calculation of ability to pay is a decision to subsidize families with child-
106. WilliamJ. Turnier, PersonalDeductionsandTaxReform: The High Road and the Low Road, 31 VILL.
L REV. 1703,1711-13 (1986); EDWIN R. A. SEuIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY,
THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 5-15 (1911).
107. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 140 (1938); see Allan J. Samansky, Tax Policy and the Obligation to Support
Children, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 372 (1996). But set Lawrence Zelenak, Children and the Income Tax, 49 TAX
L REV. 349, 359 (1994) ("From this, it would seem to follow that money spent on children should have
no more relevance to parental ability to pay income tax than money spent on vacations or sports cars.");
Borris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L REV. 1389, 1448 (1975) (only a tax
theorist would argue that spending on children was the same as spending on a yacht); Anne L. Alstott,
Comments on Samansky, "Tax Policy andthe Oblgation to Support Children", 57 OHIO ST. LJ. 381, 381-82 (1996).
But Zelenak concedes that "Simons himself was not quite that doctrinaire," Zelenak, supra, at 359 n.49, and
that Simons stated raising children is a "form of consumption on the part ofparents--whether one believes
in the subsidizing of such consumption or not." SIMONS, supra, at 140. In this Article, I am not arguing
against a Dependency Exemption, but instead argue that such an exemption should be viewed as a choice
by the government to subsidize a particular behavior-child rearing. This is a choice I wholeheartedly
support, but if the Dependency Exemption and Child Tax Credit are subsidies to families, then there can
be no justification for denying that subsidy to low-income taxpayers.
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ren. A taxpayer that makes $100,000 with no children has more money
and can afford to pay more tax than a taxpayer who makes $100,000
with 10 children. Congress has simply recognized that children are
expensive and has chosen to reduce the taxpayer's taxable income
because of that expense. But the decision to reduce taxable income
based on the number of children is a decision by Congress that children
are worthy. Congress has decided that the cost of children should be
taken into account before we determine someone's tax liability.
10 8
Why do I argue this is a welfare or subsidy concept? There are many
other expenses that impact one's ability to pay, and a decision by Con-
gress to favor one over another is in fact a subsidy to the recipient of the
amount saved by the deduction or credit. " For example, Congress has
not provided an extra exemption to parents with a disabled or special-
needs child. Obviously, it is often more expensive to care for a special-
needs child than a child who does not have special-needs, so providing
an increased deduction for a special needs child could be seen as neces-
sary based on ability to pay principles. Moreover, there is no deduction
for people who live in expensive cities or states, even though a person
making $100,000 per year has lower expenses in Gary, Indiana than he
does for the same items in San Francisco, California." 0 Congress has
been selective, deciding that some expenses warrant a deduction and
some do not. The decision by Congress that a specific expense is
deductible because it impacts on ability to pay is identical to a decision
by Congress that the expense is one that Congress believes is worth
subsidizing. By providing the subsidy, Congress is providing a specific
benefit to a specific group of people. It is just as much welfare to pro-
vide a deduction that is only warranted because a family has children as
it is to provide a check to everyone who has children. "'
108. Zelenak argues that the Dependency Exemption is not a subsidy because it is based on the ability
to pay principle. Zelenak, supra note 107, at 362. He also notes that theJoint Committee on Taxation does
not consider the Dependency Exemption a tax expenditure. Id. at 364 n.69. Congress, however, implicitly
recognized that the Dependency Exemption was a type of tax preference when it determined that the
Dependency Exemption was added back into income for purposes of calculating the alternative minimum
tax. See I.R.C. § 56(d) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004).
109. See Turnier, supra note 106, at 1711-13 (discussing how various deductions are consistent or
inconsistent with the ability to pay principle).
110. For a discussion ofcost of fiving differences and the ability to pay principle see Michael S. Knoll
& Thomas D. Griffith, Taxing Sunny Days: Adjusting Taxesfor Regional Livitg Costs andAmenities, 116 HARv. L
REV. 937 (2003) (concluding that ability to pay is not the best justification for adjusting tax rates by
jurisdiction); Jeffrey H. Kahn, PersonatDeductns-A Tax "Ideal"orustAnot,r "Deal"?, 2002 L. REV. MICH.
ST. U.-DET. C.L 1, 50 n.162.
Ill. I do not take issue with Zelenak's argument that "there is no political or popular support in the
United States today for an income tax generally treating children as just another consumption choice."
Zelenak, supra note 107, at 361. I agree that some deduction or credit for children is warranted, but my
preference reflects my belief that subsidizing families with children is positive. Regardless of our personal
4852004]
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The third rationale is to provide a deduction or credit to taxpayers
because Congress wants to reward or encourage a particular type of
behavior.'12 Under this rationale, Congress has decided to use the tax
code as a means of reaching a particular policy goal. For example,
Congress attempts to encourage home ownership through the mortgage
interest deduction and retirement savings through individual retirement
accounts. These deductions provide a direct subsidy to the taxpayer and
often are referred to as tax expenditures. Tax expenditures are the cost
to the government of providing specific tax benefits that reduce the
general tax base."' If the Child Tax Credit and the Dependency
Exemption are merely decisions to reward families then there is really
no justification for providing the subsidy only to families who have tax
liability. It is tax preferences in this third category that most resemble
welfare.
preferences, however, a decision by Congress to provide a dependency exemption within the framework
of a person's ability to pay, is a decision by Congress to subsidize the raising of children. See also Lucy A.
Williams, The Ideologv ofDivision Behavior Modifra son Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE LJ. 719, 734(1992)
(noting that we punish AFDC parents whose children are truant, but would never think of conditioning the
Dependency Exemption on a child's school attendance); Dorothy A. Brown, The Tax Treatment of Childrer:
Separate but Unequal, 54 EMORY LJ. __ (forthcoming 2005) (discussing the term welfare in the context of
the Child Tax Credit and the Earned Income Tax Credit).
112. Zelenak notes two other arguments in favor of a tax subsidies to children. Zelenak, supra note
107, at 388. First, that we should consider the well-being of the child. Id. He rejects this argument because
there is no connection between entitlement to the deduction and of any actual parental expenditures on
the child. Id. at 389. The child would clearly benefit from the increase in family income, but there is no
clear correlation between the increase in family income and the welfare of the child. Id Second, he
recognizes a human capital investment rationale (he terms an externalities rationale). Id. at 388. The
argument is that "investment in children produces important positive externalities for society at large .. "
Id at 388. He notes that the weak link here is that the credit is not premised on proofofspending on the
child. Id at 389.
113. A deviation from the tax baseline causes a reduction in revenue. This reduction in revenue has
a "cost" to the government. The cost to the Treasury due to a tax deduction, exemption, or credit is known
as a tax expenditure. The theory is that movements away from the tax baseline are really equivalent to
expenditures, because in both cases the government is giving up money. In the spending context, it is
actually providing money directly to taxpayers, and in the tax context, it is foregoing revenue it would
otherwise be entitled to receive. See I JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 8 1ST CONG., STUDY OF THE OVER-
ALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT
TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 68-69 (2001) (" [Tax expenditures
can be viewed as government spending programs that are embedded in the tax laws."); see also STANLEY
S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 2-4 (1985) (discussing tax expenditure concept);
RICHARD A. WESTIN, WG&L TAX DICTIONARY 776 (2004) (defining tax expenditure as "a diminutions
in government tax revenues that results from tax benefits granted for policy reasons and that diminish a
comprehensive tax base"); STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM; THE CONCEPT OF TAX
EXPENDITURES 179-80 (1973) (discussing tax expenditure concept); Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures:
A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE LJ. 1155, 1155 ("The concept of'tax expenditures' holds that certain provisions
of the tax laws are not really tax provisions, but are actually government spending programs disguised in
tax language." (citing SURREY, supra, at vii)); Julie Roin, Truth in Government Beyond the Tax Expenditure
Budget, 54 HASTINGS U.J. 603 (2003) (discussing the tax expenditure concept in the context of regulations);
Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REX'. 187 (2004).
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Neither the Child Tax Credit nor the Dependency Exemption can be
justified solely to clearly reflect a taxpayer's income. Children are not
a cost of doing business, and the number of children one has does not
impact what the taxpayer actually earns. It certainly impacts how far
a taxpayer can stretch his income, but the deduction or credit is not
necessary to clearly reflect a taxpayer's income. 1
4
Congress justified the Child Tax Credit on the second and third
rationale. The House Budget Committee Report states that the reason
for the Child Tax Credit was that the current Dependency Exemption
did not sufficiently reflect a family's ability to pay."5  It further noted
that the Child Tax Credit would "better recognize the financial respon-
sibilities of raising dependent children, and will promote family
values."" 6  Congressional debate on the subject further indicates that
Congress was trying to provide a subsidy to families with children." 7
While there is some indication that Congress wanted to provide the
benefit to "working" families, work itself was not a criterion. All that
was necessary was to have sufficient income to offset the credit. A
person who receives $30,000 from a trust fund would receive the full
credit, while a minimum wage worker earning $10,000 per year would
receive no credit at all.
The federal tax system therefore provides a subsidy to families with
children in a somewhat bizarre and unequal fashion. Families with tax-
114. On a theoretical level it might actually decrease income because a taxpayer may shift his or her
preferences away from earning money and towards her children.
115. H.R. REP. No. 105-148, at 309-10 (1997).
116. Jd. at 310.
117. See 143 CONG, REc. 17,108 (1997) (statement of Sen. DeWine) ("child tax credit ... will help
ease the burden of working families who need to hold down two or more jobs to make ends meet"); id.
(statement of Sen. Dorgan) (child tax credit "will be a significant benefit to American families"); id. at
17,110-11 (statement of Sen. Grams) (working families "just want to go to work to make a good living, have
a decent place to call home, and to have the opportunity to provide for their children.... child tax credit
is a great victory forfamilies"); id. at 17,113 (statement of Sen. Hutchinson) ("[i]t is the mothers and fathers
who will get help raising their children"); id. at 17,124-25 (statement by Sen. Hatch) ("The child tax credit
is especially important for America's working families. Raising children in today's world becomes more
expensive each year. This family tax credit will put the tax reliefwhere it is needed most, in the pockets
of parents with small children."); id at 16,975 (statement by Rep. Solomon) ("[tihis will better enable all
American families to care for their children"); i. at 16,976-77 (statement by Rep. Goss) ("For families
trying to pay bills ... we have provided a ... child tax credit. That is $500 more that you can use for
things like school clothes or taking the kids for a summer vacation ..... ); id. at 16,978 (statement by Rep.
Pryce) ("[t]o ease the financial burden on families with children"); id at 16,999 (statement by Rep.
Sanchez) ("This budget gives a $500 per child tax credit to every family in America."); id. at 17,007
(statement ofRep. Boehlert) ("helping working families make ends meet"); id. at 17,013 (statement of Rep.
Armey) ("It is time for Mr. and Mrs. America, as they struggle with the needs of their family which they
desire and hope and must put first, that they would have a $500-per-child tax credit so that they can do
things for their children that they know must be done.., buying the diapers . . paying for some kinder-
garten, some preschooling ... for their braces.").
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able incomes of approximately $60,000 to $110,000 receive the largest
benefit-a tax credit of $ 1,000 per child and a Dependency Exemption
worth approximately $775 per child." 8 Poor families and families with
incomes below $10,000 receive no benefit from either the tax credit or
the Dependency Exemption. Families with incomes greater than
$110,000 do not receive the tax credit, but receive up to $1,000 due to
the Dependency Exemption.119
The U.S. currently has a program to provide per child cash assis-
tance, however it ignores the people who need the assistance the most
and is not designed-to maximize investment in children. Since the Child
Tax Credit and Dependency Exemption are tax preferences to parents,
there is no requirement or incentive to invest the cash assistance in the
child's human capital.
4. Earned Income Credit
The Earned Income Credit (EIC) is designed to provide the equiva-
lent of cash assistance to low-income working people. 2° The EIC pro-
vides a credit to eligible taxpayers against taxes owed. If the taxpayer
is entitled to a credit that exceeds the amount owed, the taxpayer re-
ceives the remainder as income. The amount of the EIC first increases
as income increases to a certain level, 2 ' then flattens out, and then
decreases.
While this program provides cash assistance to families without
children, working families with children receive the greatest benefit. A
taxpayer with two children earning $10,500 in 2002 received an EIC of
$4,140, while a taxpayer with no children received a credit of $45. 122 At
lower income levels, the EIC provides over a $2,000 subsidy per child.
The program has been justified in part as a means of compensating for
118. In 2004, taxpayers with taxable incomes from $60,000 to $110,000 have a marginal rate of 25%
and receive the full $1,000 tax credit. The Dependency Exemption is $3,100. Taxpayer's benefit from a
$3,100 Dependency Exemption is $775.
119. Families with incomes over $336,550 receive no benefit from the Dependency Exemption
because it is fully phased out. See Rev. Proc. 2003-85, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1184.
120. &e I.R.C. § 32 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004). For a more detailed explanation of the Earned
Income Tax Credit see POSIN & TOBIN, supra note 96, at 639-40.
121. In 2002, the credit for a taxpayer with two children increased as the taxpayer's income rose to
$10,350. At that point, the taxpayer received a maximum credit of $4,140. The subsidy was then held
constant until the taxpayer's income reached $14,550. As the taxpayer's income exceeded $14,550, the
credit diminished, ultimately becoming zero when earnings reached $34,178. See POSIN & TOBIN, supra
note 96, at 640; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUB. 596, CAT. No. 151 73A 40-44, Earned
Income Credit (EIC): Are You Eligible? (2003), aaaik/k at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p596.pdf.
122. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 121, at 29-44.
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the regressive payroll tax,123 but the main point of the program is as a
wage support for low-income workers. 124 It is another method of pro-
viding cash assistance, through the tax code, to families with children.
Once again, however, it is cash assistance to families and there is no
requirement that the money received be spent on the recipient's
children.
5. Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
In 1935, Congress established Aid to Families with Dependent Child-
ren (AFDC), which provided cash assistance to needy families with
children.' 25 In 1996, as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Congress signifi-
candy modified the program and Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF) replaced AFDC as the main financial support to poor
families with children. 126  In actuality, when Americans discuss "wel-
fare," they are usually talking about TANF, and to a lesser extent food
stamps.'27 Unlike AFDC, however, TANF is not an entitlement pro-
gram, so qualifying recipients are not guaranteed assistance. Instead,
TANF provides block grants to the states, which are charged with creat-
ing and operating assistance programs in accordance with federal
regulations. 2' Benefit levels vary depending on the state and on family
size, but generally average around $163 per month per person or $428
per month per family. '
29
123. S. REP. No. 94-36, at 11 (1975) (noting families who currently pay little or no income tax have
been hurt by rising food and energy costs and this credit provides help for those who have to pay payroll
taxes).
124. Id.
125. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, ch. 531, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (1935)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-06 (2000)). For a complete history of aid to the poor in the
United States, see MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POOR HOUSE (1986).
126. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA),
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2260 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601-02) (2000).
127. For a discussion ofTANF and welfare reform, see, for example, PETER EDELMAN, SEARCHING
FOR AMERICA'S HEART: RFK AND THE RENEWAL OF HOPE 119-43 (2001), R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING
WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT 328-35 (2000), and MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP:
REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 322-27 (2001). For a discussion of the "single minded"
focus of cash assistance as "welfare," see David A. Super, 77e Quiet "Welfare" Revolutio Resurrecting the Food
Stomp Programin the Wake ofthe 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1271 (2004), and Brown, supra note I11.
128. 42 U.S.C. §§601-17 (2000).
129. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, INDICATORS OF VELFARE DEPENDENCE:
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, app. A, at A-13, available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/indicators02/;
see also Thomas L. Gais & Cathy M.Johnson, Welfare Refort, Management Systens, and Their Imuplication for
Children, 60 OHIO ST. L.J 1327, 1350-51 (1999) (examining state TANF benefits by quintile of caseload
changes and finding a maximum benefit at the bottom of $309 and a maximum benefit at the top of $564).
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In addition to creating a block grant program, PRWORA also set
limits on the number of years a family can receive cash assistance.
Under PRWORA, a recipient is allowed 24 consecutive months at a
time to find employment before her benefits stop, and she may not
receive benefits for more than a total of five years.1"'
TANF was a shift in welfare policy to a more punitive form of assis-
tance. TANF provides for significant sanctions against recipients who
do not comply with certain behavioral norms. For example, states are
permitted to deny benefits to teenage mothers, to children of recipients
born after a family started collecting TANF, and to recipients whose
children are truant. 131 Moreover, states may not use grant money pro-
vided under TANF to provide benefits to people who have been
convicted of a drug felony.' 32
The idea is that if a welfare recipient is faced with living "right" or
starving, she will choose the former. But a recent study of Iowa mothers
found that only about one-half of the mothers who lost their welfare
benefits then found jobs. 3 Thus, thousand of families, and thousands
of children, found themselves without income and without government
support. Furthermore, the termination or decrease in TANF benefits is
associated with higher odds that children will experience hunger and
hospitalization. 13
4
Even if society rightly determines that parents who engage in the
above behavior are unworthy of public support, their children also are
hurt by these punitive measures. The two-year-old child did nothing
wrong, but is penalized simply for being born to parents who do not
obey the law.'35 Unless society decides to put children in the above
130. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(l)(A)(ii), 608(a)(7) (2002). Up to 20% of the state's caseload may include
mothers who have exceeded the cap due to economic hardship. See id § 608(a)(7)(C).
131. AFDC provided fairly strict requirements regarding eligibility rules and benefits and states were
required to receive waivers from the government in order to deviate from those specific rules. Id § 615.
States were thus required to apply for waivers to implement family caps or to deny benefits to teen mothers.
As part of TANF, states must comply with certain requirements, but have considerably wider latitude to
design and implement their assistance programs. See id § 602 (basic requirements for plans). There is no
prohibition under TANF for states to impose family caps or restrictions on teenage beneficiaries, and the
lack ofprohibition means that states can implement such programs ifthey so choose. Moreover, 42 U.S.c.
§ 602(a)(7)(A)(iii) requires states' plans to include provisions that allow for waiver ofrequirements, including
a family cap, if those requirements unfairly penalize individuals who are at risk of, or victims of domestic
violence. See also id § 604(i) (state may sanction for truancy).
132. 21 U.S.C. § 862a(b) (2000) (felony drug convictions).
133. Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, Family Poverty, supra note 25, at 191-92.
134. John Cook et al., WelfareRefonn and the Health of(oung Children: ASentinelSuyrnyin 6U.S. Cities, 156
ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 678, 681 (2002).
135. See Cynthia Godsoe, The Ban on Welfare for Felony Dug Offenders: Giving a New Meaning to Life
Sentence, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 257 (1998) (discussing the impact on children of denying welfare
benefits to drug offenders).
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categories in foster care or orphanages because of their parents' poverty
or bad behavior, it must come up with some mechanism of ensuring that
young children are not victimized due to the actions of their parents.' 6
TANF thus operates as a short-term cash assistance program to
qualifying families with children. It is designed to help families survive
while they are facing dire economic consequences. It is only available
to the very poorest in society and serves a social purpose. Families that
receive TANF have little opportunity to use the funds as an invest-
ment. 7 Moreover, like the Dependency Exemption and the Child Tax
Credit, TANF provides cash assistance to the family, not the child. It
is not designed to provide specific benefits to the child. In fact, TANF
benefits are disseminated and terminated based on the parent's actions.
B. Previous Policy Proposals Designed to Increase Assistance to Families with
Children or to Increase Investment in Children
This section discusses various proposals to increase child well being
that have been suggested over the last 40 years. The literature is rich
with examples of programs and proposals to support human capital
investment and family incomes. Some of these proposals are briefly
described here because they provide an excellent background for the
proposal I suggest in Part IV of this Article. These proposals are
grouped into two categories-programs designed (1) to increase human
capital investment and (2) to provide minimum income assistance.
1. Human Capital Investment
In the late 1960s,James Tobin proposed a "National Youth Endow-
ment," 138 to attempt to equalize investment in human capital for the
nation's youth. Under this program, upon graduation from high school
or the attainment of age 19, every child would receive an endowment
of $5,000. The child could use the endowment to pay for higher educa-
tion, vocational training, apprenticeships, and other forms of on-the-job
136. Michael Wines, Team in lace, Gingrich Comes Out SlqgZi4 N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1994, at BI I
(discussing Newt Gingrich's proposal that orphanages may be preferable to the arrangement the current
welfare system makes for some children).
137. In fact, as CreolaJohnson notes in her recent work on welfare, although TANF provides
incentives for recipients to accumulate assets to purchase a home or to fund education, it does not allow
asset accumulation for basic human capital needs. For a discussion of welfare reform and asset
accumulation see CreolaJohnson, Welfare Reform andAssetAccumulatiom First We Need a Bed and a Car, 2000
WIS. L REV. 1221.
138. James Tobin, Raising tMe Incomes of the Poor, in AGENDA FOR THE NATION: PAPERS ON DOMESTIC
AND FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES 77, 92 (Kermit Gordon ed., 1968).
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training. Tobin did not describe an in-depth payback plan, but indi-
cated that the recipient would be required to pay back the endowment
through higher income taxes after age 28. Tobin's proposal, however,
was not mandatory, and young adults were not required to use their
endowments.
Around the same time, William Klein advocated that every child who
graduates from high school or reaches age 18, receive a set of capital
accounts from the government. 9 The individual could withdraw funds
from the account for education or health expenses. As part of this
proposal, Klein assumed the existence of a basic income support system
in addition to the capital accounts, so he proposed that the capital
accounts should be drawn down only for education or health expenses.
Some 20 years later, as part of a major project dealing with poverty,
Robert Haveman proposed personal capital accounts for youth, which
could be used to purchase education, training, and health care
services. 1 Neither Klein nor Haveman envisioned a direct payback by
the recipients of the fund.
Other scholars have examined and proposed assistance to children on
income distribution grounds.' Roberto Unger advocates "social
endowment accounts" to affect the inequities created by inter-genera-
tional transfers. People may receive such transfers through private
inheritance and/or the advantages of education and social status.
Unger believes that these inter-generational transfers make it very
difficult for the underclass to move up the economic ladder. He argues
that social endowment accounts paid for by the government should
replace private inheritance.' 4
2
Similarly, Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott have proposed that
every citizen receive an $80,000 "stake" upon reaching the age of 18.
139. William A. Klein, A Proposal for a Universal Capital Account, in INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON
POVERTY: DISCUSSION PAPERS 109 (1972).
10. ROBERT HAVEMAN, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, STARTING EVEN: AN EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM TO COMBAT THE NATION'S NEW POVERTY (1988).
141. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Practical Promise oJDemocratic Experimentalim. From the Existing
Poliy Debate to the Missing Programmati, Conversation, in WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 11, 14-15
(1996); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE
51, 209 (1998); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER & CORNEL WEST, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
PROGRESSiViSM: AN INITIATIVE FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM 62 (1998) (advocating social-
endowment accounts as a tool for self-reliance).
142. Unger, 7lzePracticalPromise, supra note 141, at 14-15.
143. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 38 (1999). Ifa
qualifying individual fails to graduate from high school, the interest of the stake is provided in smaller
increments over a number ofyears. Id. In her new book, Anne Alstott proposes a caretaker allowance,
which would provide parents or legal guardians of children underage 13 with a $5,000 payment that could
be used for child care while the adult works, the adult's education, or to set up a retirement fund. Se ANNE
L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES PAREN-TS
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Their proposal is very similar to the National Endowment Accounts
suggested by Tobin. The main difference is that the stake can be used
for any purpose. Although Ackerman and Alstott recognize the benefits
of human capital investment that may occur due to the "stake," it is not
their justification for the proposal. Their proposal rests more on egali-
tarian grounds. They argue that by providing each American with
$80,000, all Americans will have a chance at the American dream."
Some will use the stake for education, others for investment in a small
business, and others will spend the money in foolish ways, but under
Ackerman and Alstott's proposal every American has a similar oppor-
tunity to manage his stake.'45
Ackerman and Alstott's plan requires that the stake be paid back at
death, if sufficient funds exist in the estate.'46 But, since most 18 year
olds will not die for over 50 years, Ackerman and Alstott recognize the
need for a current financing mechanism. They propose that for the near
future the stake should be paid for with a two percent tax on wealth.'47
Although these plans are designed to provide the equivalent of cash
assistance, and in many cases to encourage human capital investment,
the programs are aimed at the wrong age group and are implemented
in the wrong way. First, all the proposals provide assistance to indivi-
duals once they reach the age of 18. For purposes of human capital
investment, this is too late. While Ackerman and Alstott want to even
the playing field and ensure that each citizen "is free to shape her out-
comes," providing the stake at 18 does not serve this purpose.'48 A child
with poor education, poor health, or poor nutrition does not start in the
same place as children without such problems. The children who suffer
from lower human capital investment will not be in the same position
to take advantage of the stake. The investment must take place well
before age 18. Tobin, Klein, and Haveman's proposals suffer from the
same limitation. 149
Second, all the proposals except Ackerman and Alstott's require that
the capital investment come from general funds, and there is no require-
ment that the funds be paid back. Although I have no problem with
assistance to children being paid from the general fund, there is clearly
(2004). This program differs significantly from the one proposed in this Article because the money is
provided to the caretaker, not the child, and is not designed to increase the child's human capital.
144. ACKERMAN & ALSTOrr, supra note 143, at 24.
145. Id. at 9. As Ackerman and Alstott recognize, some Americans will have their "stake" and more.
Since everyone receives a stake, those with more economic resources will receive a "stake" plus.
146. Id. at 90-93.
147. Id at 102.
148. Id. at 24.
149. Tobin, .rupra note 138, at 92; H-AVEMAN, supra note 140, at 155; Klein, mupra note 139, at 4.
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no national support for such a proposal. Moreover, to the extent the
proposal is not funded, it is open to the same criticisms that have been
levied against AFDC and TANF. Finally, if the benefit is seen as
welfare, Congress will be more willing to place controls or constraints
on the beneficiaries. Congress could deny funds to felons, drug users, or
children who have been suspended from school. It may be that these
children are the ones most in need of human capital investment. In this
political climate, a program must have a strong payback component to
have any chance of success. Moreover, the payback plan must be tied
to the needs of the population that receives the benefit.
Third, many of the proposals do not allow the accounts to be used
broadly enough. To the extent the accounts can only be used for educa-
tion or health, they fail to provide a sufficiently broad base for human
capital investment. A family with food insecurity or poor housing
should be able to use the funds to purchase food or pay the rent.
Families should also be able to use the funds for child care, preschool,
or other educational programs.
Finally, to the extent possible, a broad-based mandatory program is
preferable to an optional one. For economic, administrative, and
societal reasons, the program will be stronger if all children receive the
benefit. On economic grounds, the greater diversity in the pool of reci-
pients, the greater chances that a payback plan will work. If the plan is
optional, there is a greater chance that only the "risky" investors will
participate.
A mandatory plan will provide better stability for the program and
will be easier to administer. All children will be considered to have
participated and will be required to participate in paying the funds back.
These attributes ensure that the program will not be seen as a welfare
program for the poor. Just as Social Security recipients are not viewed
as "on welfare," there will be no stigma attached to receiving benefits as
part of a broad-based child human capital investment program. 5 '
150. See Martha B. Coven, The Feedom to S d- 77ze Casefor Cash-Based Publ Assistance, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 847, 891 (2002).
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2. Minimum Income Assistance
Several prominent scholars, including Milton Friedman 5' and Anne
Alstott, 52 have advocated a basic income support system.'53  One
popular mechanism for providing a basic level of income is the negative
income tax. The negative income tax generally provides for a tax credit
designed to reflect the basic needs of an individual in society. To the
extent an individual has no tax liability because his income is too low,
the tax credit is fully refundable. Thus, if the tax credit for subsistence
was set at $10,000, a person with no income would receive a tax credit
of $10,000. A person with $100,000 of income and $30,000 of tax
liability would receive a $10,000 credit and therefore have a tax liability
of only $20,000.
Because the credit is integrated into the progressive nature of the tax
code, the benefit of the credit gradually decreases as a person earns
more income. The person is always better off, however, by working.
For example, a person with no income would receive a negative income
tax payment of$ 10,000. If a person's income rose from zero to $5,000,
the $5,000 would be taxable at the prevailing marginal rate, say 15
percent. The individual would thus have an initial tax of $750. The
$10,000 credit would then be applied and he would receive a negative
income tax payment of $9,250. By earning an additional $5,000, the
individual would be able to raise his total from $10,000 to $14,250
($9,250 negative income tax + $5,000 of income). Although there is
obviously some cost to earning money, the negative income tax is
designed so that a person will have an economic incentive to increase his
earnings.' 5
4
The negative income tax is not premised on human capital theory.
Friedman argued that, through various social welfare programs, the
151. Milton Friedman, The Case for the Negative Income Tax, in REPUBLICAN PAPERS 202 (Melvin R.
Laird ed., 1968); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITAUISMAND FREEDOM 190-94 (1962) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM].
152. Anne Alstott, Work vs. Freedom. A Liberal Challenge to Employnent Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 967
(1999).
153. The idea of providing a basic minimum income for all has enjoyed bi-partisan support. In
addition to Freidman's negative income tax proposal, President Nixon also proposed a minimum family
income benefit for all citizens. See Family Assistance Act of 1969, H.R. 14,173, 91st Cong. (1st Sess.);
VINCENTJ.BURKE & VEE BURKE, NIXON'S GOOD DEED: WELFARE REFORM (1974) (discussing the
history of Nixon's proposal); see alsoJames Tobin, The Case for an Income Guarantee, 4 PUB. INT. 31, 36-38
(1966) (promoting the idea of an income guarantee); James Tobin et al., IsaNegative Income Tax Practical?,
77 YALE LJ. 1, 1-4 (1967); Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal
Subsidy Policy, b4 U. CHI. L REV. 405, 469 (1997); Alstott, supra note 152; RobertJ. Lampman,Approaches
to the Reduction of Povery, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 521, 526-27 (1965).
154. SeeFriedman,Negative, supranote 151, at 208; FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 151, at 192-
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government already provided a minimum annual income.155 He argued
that a negative income tax was a more efficient method of distributing
such aid because the existing programs were not well targeted for those
in need.5 6 He further argued that his proposal, unlike current welfare
programs, "treat[ed] indigents as responsible individuals, not incom-
petent wards of the state."'' 57 He argued that a negative income tax
would give the poor responsibility over their own welfare, thus increas-
ing their self-esteem and independence.' 
58
Friedman's proposal is based on different grounds than the one pre-
sented here. He sought to provide minimum income to all. My pro-
posal is far more limited and less monumental. I advocate a method for
increasing investment in children and thus increasing their welfare.
Friedman's proposal would do that as well, since some of the tax credit
obviously would trickle down to children. Although Friedman's pro-
posal received strong support for a period of years, it has been more
than 30 years since he first advocated the negative income tax. Smaller
steps must be taken.
The proposal I advocate is designed to incorporate policies and
theories that can be supported by liberals and conservatives. It is inte-
resting that both Friedman (traditionally thought of as conservative) and
Ackerman and Alstott (traditionally thought of as liberal) have coalesced
around the idea of personal empowerment. Both proposals advocate
giving people power over their financial decisions and limiting
government interference in the way funds are expended. My proposal
embraces this personal empowerment theory and attempts to provide
a mechanism whereby individuals, and not government, make decisions
regarding how the funds should be invested.
IV. INVESTING IN CHILDREN THROUGH A SELF-SUSTAINING
CHILD INVESTMENT PLAN
This Part proposes an investment program for children. After briefly
summarizing the proposal, subpart B discusses the program components
and addresses some of the potential criticisms of the proposal. Subpart
C examines other more limited options for investing in children and
considers two types of non-mandatory proposals to increase investment
in children.
155. Friedman, AN'gativ, supra note 151, at 202.
156. Id at 214.
157. Id. at 211.
158. Id
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A. A Summay of the Proposal
In order to increase investment in children and provide a minimum
subsistence level of benefits to children, I propose that every child under
age 15 receive a payment of around $2,000 per year. The money
belongs to the child, and a parent or another responsible adult acts as a
fiduciary over the money.'59 The money may be used for any purpose
consistent with that fiduciary duty. 6 '
For example, if families are in extreme poverty-income at less than
one-half of the poverty level-the parent could use the payment for
food, clothing, or housing for the child. Parents slightly above poverty
might choose to save it for college, use it to provide better day care for
their child, send their child to private school, or move to a better neigh-
borhood. Middle-income families might save it for the child's higher
education, send their child to private school, or provide the child with
a "nest egg" when she leaves home. At all levels of income, the
payment might serve as money of last resort when a child becomes
seriously ill.
The point is that adults, acting as fiduciaries for the child, decide how
the payment should be spent. The goal is for the parents to use the
money to increase human capital investment in their children. The plan
recognizes that parents, not the government, are generally the bestiudge
of what particular investment best serves the child's needs. Just as the
government exercises very little oversight regarding how Social Security
payments are spent, it should exercise very limited oversight here.
But since this money is designed as a public investment, not a subsidy,
the child is responsible for paying back the amount she receives. Once
the program is in full effect, every person who received the payment
would pay in taxes an extra two percent of adjusted gross income. The
child thus will pay back the amount invested over his or her working
life. '6 As with Social Security, some children will pay back more and
159. Under common law, some states recognize that parents, in exchange for their support, have a
right to their child's earnings. See Hines v. Cheshire, 219 P.2d 100 (Wash. 1950) (parent has the right to
the child's earnings); Raney v. Barnes Lumber Corp., 81 S.E.2d 578 (Va. 1954); Reyna v. Vowell, 470
F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1972) (Texas law); Mitchell v. Mosher, 362 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. 1962); Immel v. Richards,
93 N.E.2d 474 (Ohio 1950).
160. Depending on state law, parents do not necessarily have a fiduciary duty to their child. Compare
Murphy v. Murphy, 694 A.2d 932 (Me. 1997); In re The Marriage of William T. Glover v. Torrence, 723
N.E.2d 924 (Ind. 2000); State v. Crystal D. Gould, 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001) (finding a fiduciary duty
between parent and child) with Estate ofJohn A. Kieras v. Kieras, 521 N.E.2d 263, 266 (Ill. 1988) ("the
relationship between parent and child is not fiduciary as a matter of law"); Curtis v. Freden, 585 P.2d 993,
998 (Kan. 1978) ("The mere relationship ofparent and child does not raise a presumption ofa confidential
and fiduciary relationship.").
161. Because the payback is tied to gross income, a person starts paying back the amount received
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some less, but every recipient who works will make some payment in
return for the investment. 1
62
B. Program Component'--How the Proposal Would Work
1. Child Investment Fund
The assistance to children under this program will be cash assistance.
I have specifically rejected using vouchers or other types of cash
equivalents. The child investment funds need to be used in ways that
are the most beneficial to the child. For some children, the best use of
the funds might be to hire a nanny; in other cases, the money might
best be used to provide better housing or to purchase food. If vouchers
or other cash equivalents were used, children would have fewer options
regarding the use of the investment funds, and the funds might not be
used in the most efficient manner.1 6
3
Moreover, using non-cash equivalents will most likely hurt poor and
low-income individuals. Children in upper-middle and higher-income
households will not necessarily consume the benefit immediately. They
will likely save the money for their child's education or some other
future expenditure because they are meeting the current consumption
and investment needs of their children. Any voucher they received
would be placed in an appropriate savings mechanism for the child's
ftiture.'" Lower-income families, however, will need to make invest-
ments now, and the types of human capital investments they may need
to make will be those least accommodated by vouchers.
6 5
For example, a lower-income person may want to use the child
benefit to put her child in better home day care. It would be a signifi-
cant administrative burden to require all home day care operators to
accept payment through the voucher system. Similarly, the family
might want to use the money for food or clothes at local stores or to pay
rent or other housing costs. Forcing the providers of these items to
once they have gross income. The payback, therefore, may start at any age. Similarly, the payback stops
once a person has no gross income.
162. Throughout the course ofthe program, interest rates and risk factors will change. The payback
tax and payment amount may need to be adjusted to ensure that the program remains fiscally neutral.
163. For an excellent discussion defending the use of cash assistance see Coven, supra note 150.
164. This is a perfectly appropriate use for the money. Most families in the United States struggle
to finance their children's education. To the extent middle- and upper-income families are already
providing sufficient current capital investment for the future, it makes sense for them to save the amount
received for future human capital investment.
165. For a discussion of how cash transfers increase human dignity and reduce social stigma see
Coven, supra note 150, at 890.
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accept vouchers could be onerous. Cash payments, however, are flexi-
ble and thus essential to maximize human capital investment in child-
ren. To the extent that one designs a voucher or other non-cash assis-
tance program flexibly enough to accommodate these concerns, then
the voucher is really no different than cash.
2. Child Fiduciary
The benefits will be distributed to children through a government
agency, most likely the IRS or the SSA, in a manner similar to that used
by Alaska. Parents, guardians, or other responsible adults will apply for
the benefit on the child's behalf upon the birth of the child."'6 These
responsible parties will be considered the Child's Fiduciary (CF) and will
be charged with making decisions regarding how the Child Investment
Funds should be spent.'67 There is, however, a serious question regard-
ing how much leeway or control the CF should have over the child's
money.
One option, following the Alaska model, would be to impose almost
no regulation or oversight on the CF's investment decisions. The
government would distribute the benefit and the CF would be required
to spend the funds for the child's benefit, but there would be no account-
ing for how the money was spent. This is similar to the way in which
Social Security benefits are paid to adults.
The Alaska model is inappropriate in this context because it fails to
properly direct the payment to the child and is ripe for abuse. Such a
system would make the Child Investment Fund a family benefit almost
undistinguishable from the Child Tax Credit. This is particularly
improper in the context of this program because the child is going to
have to pay back the amount received when he starts working.
A second option would be to have fairly strict government control
over the payment. The government would mandate that a CF could use
166. Ifsomeone fails to apply for the child benefit on behalf of the child, the money will accrue in
a "child investment account." The amount in the account will earn interest. Once a CF is appointed, the
CF will be able to draw down the funds in the investment account. If no CF is ever appointed for the child,
the child will be able to apply for the funds in the account when he or she reaches the age of 18.
167. The CF would be chosen through a set of default rules similar to those used by the SSA in
selecting a representative payee. Default rules would provide that in cases where the child lives with his
parents, the parents jointly would be the CF. If the parents were not married, then the CF would be the
parent who has custody of the child. If the parents were incompetent, under age 18, or otherwise not
capable of carrying out the responsibilities of a CF, the CF for the child would have to be appointed by a
relevant government agency.
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the funds only for a qualified purchase.'68 As previously discussed in the
voucher context, a program that significantly limits a CF's flexibility to
make investments in the child may inhibit people from making the exact
kinds of investments that are most needed for their particular child.
Another option would be to have a social worker system in which
each child would have a social worker assigned to monitor how the
child's investment benefit was spent. For example, France has a very
complex system of benefits to families with children. '69 Raising children
is considered both an individual and a communal responsibility, and a
state social worker is assigned to aid each family. The U.S. could design
a similar system, however, it would be administratively burdensome and
extremely expensive. It would also be very intrusive and propel the
government into intimate family decisions.
My proposal employs a middle ground among these options: a CF
will have a statutorily imposed fiduciary duty to spend the child benefit
in a way that aids investment in the child's human capital. 7 ' It would
be necessary for the federal government to mandate the CF's duty
because state common law is in conflict regarding whether a parent has
a fiduciary duty to the child.' 7 ' In some states, like Alaska, the parent
is deemed to have control, and in some cases, ownership, over the
child's money. 172
Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott have developed a theory of examin-
ing and treating the parent-child relationship as a fiduciary one.
7 3
Although I do not need to adopt their theory for the entire parent-child
relationship, it does provide a nice basis for establishing a fiduciary duty
under this proposal. A fiduciary duty is generally defined as the duty to
act for another's benefit.'74 In business, it encompasses the duties of care
and of loyalty. The duty of care requires a CF to use reasonable
diligence in managing the child's money and deciding how to expend
168. For example, James Tobin, in his proposal for human capital accounts, would allow the
payment to be used for "higher education, vocational training, apprenticeship, and other forms of on-the-
job-training." Tobin, supra note 138, at 92. For the program to qualify, he would require that the recipient
be approved by a government agency.
169. See BARBARA R. BERGMANN, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM POVERTY: WHAT THE UNITED
STATES cAN LEARN FROM FRANCE (1996).
170. For example, the Uniform Transfer to Minors Act a custodian must exercise "the standard of
care that would be observed by a prudent person dealing with property of another." UNIF. TRANSFERS
TO MINORS ACT § 12(b) (1983).
17 1. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
172. Seetsupra note 159.
173. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parent as Fidudaries, 81 VA. L REV. 2401, 2419 (1995)
(fiduciary relationship captures the essence of a parental obligation to serve the child's interests).
174. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 410 (7th ed. 1999).
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the funds. The duty of loyalty requires the CF to put the interests of the
child first when considering how to spend the benefit.
The standard for judging whether the CF is acting properly will be
whether the CF is investing the funds in a reasonable manner for the
child's benefit. The relevant government agency could promulgate rules
that would provide a safe harbor for expenditures made by the CF. For
example, the regulations could indicate that educational expenses, day
care, food, housing, and tutoring are permissible expenditures. In order
to ensure flexibility, the regulation should be designed to create such a
safe harbor without restricting the CF's discretion.
Granting the CF broader discretion, however, increases the chance
that a CF will abuse that discretion and misallocate funds. But as Scott
and Scott recognize in their discussion of a parent's fiduciary duty,
"[t]he affective bond provides powerful grounding for a parental
precommitment to care for the welfare of one's child."' 75 Social norms
will act as informal rules to ensure that parents act in a way that is in the
best interest of the child. In other words, most CFs will properly invest
the funds in their child's human capital.
Finally, the misuse of a child's investment benefit is an abuse of the
child's trust. There is no question that some parents currently abuse
their children's trust, but in most cases the state attempts to take action
against parents for such abuses. Nothing is more precious than a child's
health and safety. If a parent can be trusted with custody of the child,
it is reasonable to trust that same parent with the duty to manage the
Child Investment Fund.
It is inevitable, however, that some CFs will abuse their positions as
fiduciaries. An administrative system would have to be created to
adjudicate complaints without overburdening the legal system. There
appears to be no great answer to this problem, but there are two existing
models that provide examples of how fiduciary relationships between
parents and children are enforced. Under the Uniform Transfer to
Minors Act, the custodian, usually the child's parent, is required to act
as a "prudent person" dealing with another's property. '76 The custodian
is also required to keep records of all transactions and make them
available to the parent or the minor if the minor is at least 14 years
old.'7 7 If a custodian breaches his duty to the child, the child may bring
an action against the custodian to recover the lost funds.'78
175. Scott & Scott, supra note 173, at 2434.
176. Seesupra note 170.
177. UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT § 12(d) (1986).
178. See In re the Marriage of Beverly Robin Rosenfeld, 668 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Iowa 2003) (father
misappropriate daughters UTMA funds and was required to repay); Buder v. Sartore, 774 P.2d 1383
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There are very few reported cases involving a child suing a parent for
mismanagement of UTMA accounts and almost all the conflicts arise in
divorce cases. 179 UTMA funds, however, have a natural check against
abuse because a family member usually gave the child the funds in the
first place. The Child Investment Fund, however, will be a government
benefit that the child will have to pay back, and it will be paid to every
child regardless of circumstance. There is a significant risk that provid-
ing children with an action against their parents will be unworkable in
the Child Investment Fund situation.
The SSA deals with this problem by requiring an accounting by the
representative payee, by reserving the right to revoke the right to be a
representative payee, and by requiring the representative payee to pay
back funds that were not spent on the child's behalf. These same tools
can be used to sanction CFs who abuse their fiduciary responsibilities.
A CF would be required to file (with his income tax return) a one-
page form indicating how the child benefit was spent. The agency in
charge of implementing the program would have the authority to
question a CF regarding the form and take action to ensure that the CF
was not abusing his position of trust. The agency also could question
the CF based on a referral from a social service agency or an individual
complaint. In fact, the child benefit might provide a mechanism for
social services to provide real help to a struggling family, by providing
early intervention when a problem arises. In addition, if the supervising
agency found a violation by the child fiduciary, the agency could order
that the funds be repaid to the child.
3. Who Receives the Benefit?
As previously discussed, the child investment benefit is provided
directly to the child. Unlike the Child Tax Credit or TANF, this invest-
ment benefit is specifically designed to increase investment in the child.
In a study on family spending patterns, Lazear and Michael found that
a family spends approximately $38 per child for every $100 spent per
adult. 8 ' Thus, two adults with two children can be expected to spend
(Colo. 1989) (father breached fiduciary duty to children when he failed to prudently invest certain of their
funds and used the funds for his own personal use. The father was required to pay back the funds with
interest.); In re Levy, 412 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1978) (recognizing an action bychildren against their
mother, the custodian of UTMA accounts, for commingling funds and using the children's funds to pay
the debts of husband's estate).
179. See cases cited supra note 178.
180. EDWARD P. LAZEAR & ROBERT T. MICHAEL, ALLOCATION OF INCOME WITHIN THE
HOUSEHOLD 6-7, 77-114 (1988) (thus 27.5% of expenditures are spent on the child); see also LINO, supra
note 11, at 12 (indicating that a one child family spends from 26% to 33% of its income on its child).
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$55 on their children for every $200 they spend on themselves. If the
hypothetical four-person family was entitled to a Child Tax Credit of
$2,000, approximately $550 of that would be spent on the child and
presumably some fraction of the amount spent on the child would be
spent investing in the child's human capital.
If the benefit is delivered directly to the child, the entire amount of
the benefit should be spent on the child. A direct child investment
benefit increases the chances that the money will actually be invested in
the child's human capital. Such an investment is particularly important
in this program because the child, not the parents, is responsible for
paying back the funds received.
In addition, the benefit is designed to ensure that children in our
society are cared for and have the ability to realize their potential. The
goal would be to support a broad-based program that was available to
everyone living in the United States. Realistically, however, since this
program is designed to provide an investment in children with a com-
mensurate payback, the program needs to be targeted to those children
who will likely be in the United States during their working years. I
would therefore require that recipients be United States citizens or
resident aliens to receive the benefits under this program.
The Child Investment Fund program is also available only to children
under 15 years of age. The program is limited for several reasons. First,
it appears that the greatest deficit in childhood investment is in the early
years.18' By age 15, certain investments, like child care and pre-kinder-
garten education, are no longer necessary. Second, in most states, child-
ren at age 15 may engage in part-time employment and the teen's own
initiative can make up for the lost benefit. Third, the program proposed
here is expensive and is designed to be fully paid for with only a minor
drain on the recipient's future resources. Stopping the payment after
age 14 is simply more affordable than continuing the program through
age 17.182
4. Costs of the Program
This program provides a vision for the future and is designed to
ensure that each child in America receives at least a minimum level of
human capital investment.'83 The exact budget implications of the
181. See, e.g., Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, Famiy Poverty, supra note 25, at 188.
182. In fact, a less grandiose version could be implemented that provides the benefit only to children
up to age six. This would significantly limit the amount of investment in children, but would be far more
affordable and would provide cash assistance to children when they need it the most.
183. The idea is to provide a set amount of capital investment each year. Absent a prohibition, the
potential income stream could be sold on the market for a set fee based on a discount rate. For example,
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program are immensely complicated and vary greatly depending on
interest rates, inflation, and other economic assumptions relied upon in
the calculations. Moreover, the costs of the program also depend on
whether one expects children to pay back the amount received plus the
costs of inflation (thus each child is paying back what he received), or
whether one expects them to pay back the amount received plus interest
(thus providing for a market rate payback of the amount received).
Finally, one's view of the cost of the program also depends on whether
the government makes an up-front investment in the program, ame-
liorating the sigifificant start-up costs.
One way of examining the cost of the program without complicated
economic models is to determine whether the program is self-sufficient
once it is fully phased in. There are approximately 60 million children
under the age of 15, and this population demographic has held relatively
constant over the last several years.'84 Under these assumptions, in any
given year the government would be required to distribute approxi-
mately $120 billion to children. In 2000, the total adjusted gross income
for taxpayers was $6.42 trillion." 5 A two percent payback tax tied to
gross income would raise approximately $128.5 billion. Thus, if the
program had existed in 2000, the amount paid in would exceed the
amount paid out by approximately $8.5 billion.".' This does not take
into account any increase in wages or economic growth that may occur
due to the increase in investment in human capital.
Another way of examining the fiscal consequences of this proposal is
to examine what would happen to the hypothetical "median person."
This calculation is far more complex and is highly influenced by
decisions one makes regarding interest rates, wage growth, and inflation.
In addition, the investment in children should increase productivity and
wage growth. The two percent payback tax only accounts for part of
a $2,000 payment over 15 years would be worth $20,759 at a discount rate of 5%. Allowing the CF to sell
the discount stream for a set payment might allow the CF to make one very large capital investment or to
determine that the CF could invest the money more profitably than relying on the discount rate. Since the
proposal is designed to help ensure a set amount of capital investment, it is imperative to protect against
the potential loss or squandering ofthe entire child benefit. I would, therefore, prohibit a CF from entering
into such a contract. For a discussion of this issue in the context of the "Stakeholder Society," see
ACKERMAN & AtsroTT, supra note 143, at 57.
184. POPULATION PROJECTIONS PROGRAM, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION PROJECTIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES BY AGE, SEX, RAGE, HISPANIC ORIGIN, AND NATIVITY: 1999 TO 2100(2000),
availabLe at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/natsum-T3.html.
185. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME, TABLE 1. I: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RETURNS: SELECTED INCOME AND TAX ITEMS, BYSIZE AND ACCUMULATED SIZE OFAD)JUSTED GROSS
INCOME (2000), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/OOin Isi.xls.
186. In order to avoid the situation where currently unused tax deductions could be taken against
the payback tax, the payback tax must be added after the tax due is established. Thus, ifa person had a
tax liability of $2,000, and a payback tax of S1,000, the total tax bill would be S3,000.
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the revenue the government will receive from this program. In addition
to the payback tax, general tax revenue will increase due to higher wage
growth. Because of this benefit to the government, one can assume that
the person paying back the Child Investment Fund only needs to pay
back the funds received accounting for inflation. The opportunity costs
for the government for not having the ability to invest the child invest-
ment payment in another activity are borne by the government and are
covered by the increased general revenue to the government. Under
these assumptions, the median person will pay back the amount received
by her fifties or early sixties. If the median person was expected to
payback the amount received plus market rate interest, the payback
would have to be increased or the payout decreased for the program to
completely pay for itself.87
In any event, the point of this project is not to set the exact amount
of the payment and the payback. There is some point where a reason-
able equilibrium can be reached between the payout and the payback.
Whether that point is a payout of $2,000 through age ten, or a payout
of $2,000 through age 14, or whether the payback should be one and
one-half percent or two percent is a debate for another time. What is
clear is that the program I suggest can provide a significant payout that
should increase investment in children, with a commensurate payback
and without breaking the federal budget.
For administrative convenience, the payback would be collected
along with the taxpayer's federal income taxes. This could be done in
several ways. First, the payback could be collected by age. The pay-
ment would be made to all children of a particular age group, making
it clear what cohort received the payout. The payback tax would then
apply only to people within the age range that received benefits. That
age would increase as more and more of the population consisted of
people who received the payout. This has the disadvantage of taxing all
people within this age group, even people within the age group who did
not receive the benefit. This means that people who immigrate to this
country will be subject to the payback tax even though they never
received the Child Investment Fund.
The system could also be set up so that only children who received
the child investment benefit were subject to the payback tax. The child
benefit could be tied to the child's social security number, so it would be
relatively easy to design a tax form and system that only required child-
ren who received the benefit to pay the payback amount. 188
187. See Appendix infra for description of the calculations.
188. The program would have to be phased in. You could design a system whereby children who
received less of a benefit during the phase-in years have a lower payback. For example, a child who was
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5. Ensuring Continued Investment in Children-Promises Kept
The point of this proposal is to increase human capital investment in
children. Ijustify a payback because the benefits to children under this
program will be worth the cost. In this discussion, however, I assume
that current investments in children remain at least constant. If the
child benefit becomes an excuse for cutting existing programs, invest-
ment in children will not increase, and the proposal will be a serious
failure.
As previously discussed, investing in children is both necessary for a
productive society and for productive children, and the current invest-
ment is clearly insufficient. One concern with this proposal is that
Congress will cut funding for other investment programs because
children would now have their own funds that they could spend in lieu
of such programs. Cutting Head Start, for example, because children
now have a $2,000 child benefit that they could use to pay for Head
Start will only hurt children. The promise to them of increased invest-
ment will be illusory while the cost to them will increase. 9
I recommend that the adoption of this program also include an
escalation clause providing that the amount of child benefit is auto-
matically increased by any commensurate decrease in general federal
funding for children. Funding for children should at least remain
constant, including adjustments for inflation. If funding for children
decreases, the amount of the child benefit should be increased pro rata
by that amount. This will ensure that the program actually provides
increased investment in our children.
6. Response to Potential Criticisms of the Proposal
Although there are endless criticisms that could be leveled against a
program of this magnitude, there are two criticisms that warrant parti-
cular attention. Opponents of government programs often argue that
they are inefficient or that government intervention distorts the market-
place causing negative outcomes. This subpart addresses the concerns
that the Child Investment Funds might be wasted, or might encourage
harmful behavior.
14 when the program started, and thus only received one $2,000 payment might only be required to pay
a payback tax of 0.1%, a 13-year old might be required to pay 0.2% and so on.
189. Similarly, the Child Tax Credit or the Earned Income Tax Credit should not be reduced as a
means of funding this program.
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a. Efficiengy
One criticism of this proposal is that CFs will waste the Child Invest-
ment Fund. Critics of social welfare programs often claim that reci-
pients are wasting funds on drugs or alcohol or luxuries. "0
The administrative process of choosing a CF, discussed above, is one
structural component of the Child Investment Fund program designed
to lessen these efficiency concerns. Presumably, the CF must use the
Child Investment Funds for investment in the child recipient. But even
with these controls, some may be concerned that the CF will waste the
funds, or use them for drugs or alcohol. Although any program or
policy will have some waste, many of the concerns about waste in the
social welfare context are based on negative and untrue stereotypes
about the poor that are often asserted without any empirical evidence.'
9
'
The scholarship surrounding these issues provides very little evidence
that benefit recipients waste government funds.' 
92
In her work on cash transfers, Martha Coven concludes that low-
income people are usually more careful with their money than middle-
or upper-class individuals.'93 She explains that the marginal utility for
190. See Daniel M. Weintraub,AdocatsforPoorPotest Wilson's WelfareRemark; Budget Governoris Called
Insnsitve After Saying AFDC Cut Would Leave Recpients Less to Spend on Beer, L.A. TIMES,Jan. 12, 1991, at A l
(Gov. Pete Wilson defending cuts in AFDC saying that it will just mean that welfare recipients will not be
able to buy a six-pack of beer); Kevin Sack, The 1992 Campaigsc Issues; The ew, Volatile Politics of Wefare,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1992, § 1, at 24 (Democratic state senator Creedon states that people on general
relief are just "[taking the money] and go[ing] to the nearest bar and spend it."); Thomas O'Brien,
RethiAking Amerca's Safef et, WORLD & I, May 1, 2003, available at 2003 WL 11504883 (asserting without
any indications ofactual knowledge that "[i] t is a withering injustice for lower-income working parents who
buy generic items and wait in the checkout line with carts full of off-brand foods when the customer in front
of them uses food stamps to purchase expensive, brand-namejunk food items that the working parents feel
they cannot afford for their own families."). President Reagan promoted this idea by talking about a
"welfare queen" who was driving a Cadillac. The woman in question, Linda Taylor, was actually com-
mitting welfare fraud, and was claiming government benefits under a number of different aliases. Welfare
payments were clearly not enough for her to buy a Cadillac. Ultimately, the Cadillac was repossessed by
the state because it was "believed [to be] used in the commission of a crime." "Welfare Queen" Loses Her
Cadilac Limousine, N.Y. TIMES, February 29, 1976, at 42.
191. See DAVID ZUCCHINO, MYTH OF THE WELFARE QUEEN: A PULITZER PRIZE-WINNING
JOURNALIST'S PORTRAIT OF WOMEN ON THE LINE 117 (1997). See also MARK ROBERT RANK, LIVING
ON THE EDGE: THE REALITIES OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 2-3 (1994) (discussing welfare myths and
egregious political statements, including "People are saying these breeding factories have got to stop," and
politicians suggesting selling the organs of dead welfare recipients without consent). See generally Williams,
supra note Ill (discussing and refuting arguments against AFDC that are based on racial or class
stereotypes). See also Weintraub, supra note 190; Sack, supra note 190 (Creedon also stated that "[g]eneral
[r]elief goes to people who are urinating on the floor in the bus station.... They take that $338 and go to
the nearest bar and spend it."); O'Brien, supra note 190 (asserting without support that food stamp reci-
pients waste their food stamps on non-nutritional items).
192. For a discussion about how the moral hazard doctrine has been used improperly to limit social
responsibility, see Tom Baker, On the Genealg of Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REV. 237 (1996).
193. Coven, supra note 150, at 898; see a/sojan M. Newton, Economic Rationali ofthte Poor, 36 HUM.
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money declines as income increases. Thus money, or spending it wisely,
is worth more to people with lower-incomes than higher ones.'94 The
simple reason for this is that poor people have more to lose when they
waste funds. A poor person's failure to spend money wisely can be the
difference between whether or not she has food or clothing for her
children.
In a recent study examining the spending patterns of people on public
assistance, Lucilla Tan found that families on public assistance spend
almost all of their income on necessities.195 Over 70 percent of assisted
families' incomes went to food, housing, or transportation, with another
ten percent going to clothing, health, or education.'96 Assisted families
spent a little over four percent for entertainment and a little over seven
percent for "other expenditures."' 19 7 Thus the prevailing picture is not
one of poor people wasting money on drugs and alcohol, but is instead
one of people working hard to make ends meet. 98
Moreover, contrary to public perception, there appears to be very
little evidence that there is a large problem with drug-addicted mothers
spending all the family resources for drugs. In a recent study, James
Swartz and colleagues concluded that providing Supplemental Social
Security Income (SSI) to people with drug addictions did not increase
the level of drug use." In other words, the level of the government
benefit had no significant impact on drug use. Other studies have found
that while drug abusers will increase their drug use as income rises,
OR. 50, 58(t977); StephessJ. Hoch et al., DeminantsofStore-LevelPrtie Elasticify, 32J. MARKETING RES.
17, 28 (1995) (people with more expensive homes and people who are more educated are less price
sensitive); R. P. Bagozzi, Marketing as ExchangeJ. MARKETING, Oct. 1975 at 32 (poor persons use limited
resources wisely).
194. Coven, supra note 150, at 898.
195. Lucilla Tan, Spending Patterns of Pubfi-Assisted Fanilies, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 2000, at 29,
33-34,
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE
WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK 280 (1997) (finding that a third of low-income families spent nothing
on entertainment in the last year, two-thirds did not eat out, and approximately half spent nothing on
cigarettes or alcohol).
199. James A Swartz et al., Disability Paymnents, Drug Use and Representative Payees: An Anaysis of the
Re/atiionslps, 98 ADDICTION 965,965-75 (2003) (finding that supplemental security income (SSI) disability
payments to people addicted to drugs do not increase the level of drug use); see also Robert Rosenheck &
Linda Frisman, Do Public Support Paynents Encourage SubstanceAbuse?, 15 HEALTH AFF. 192, 194-95 (1996)
(finding that people who received high levels of public support had no greater tendency to use or purchase
drugs than people with lower levels of public support); Dru Stevenson, ShouldAddicts Get Welfare?Addittion
&SSI/SSDI, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 185, 198-200, 221 (2002) (finding little correlation between SSI payments
and drug use).
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increases in income have no impact on drug use among non-drug
users.
200
To the extent that there is a concern about low-income people on
drugs wasting family resources, the problem is not limited to this
program and needs to be addressed on a broader scale. The problem
exists whether or not there is a Child Investment Fund. In fact, the
problems facing a child due to a parent or guardian's heavy drug use are
far more serious than the concern that the child's CF might spend the
money on drugs. If parents are unfit to care for their children, action
should be taken to protect the children regardless of the financial situa-
tion in the family.
There is, however, the possibility that unfit or irresponsible parents
would not, absent controls, spend the Child Investment Fund wisely.
The design of the Fund, however, should alleviate many of these con-
cerns. If a parent has a drug or alcohol problem, or is otherwise unfit
to be a CF, the relevant agency can appoint an alternate CF for the
child. Since the cash assistance is the child's, the drug addicted parent
or guardian has no right to the payment. The alternative CF could
ensure that the child's money is actually spent on the child. This is
particularly important if one believes that the family's other resources
are being spent on drugs. If that is the case, the child is obviously
suffering from low human capital investment. Allowing an independent
CF to control the money will at least ensure that the child receives a
minimum level of human capital investment.
In addition, the child benefit also might help identify children in
households with drug abusers and help the child's parent or guardian
find treatment. For example, a teacher might realize that a child was
not receiving sufficient food or clothing. The teacher could report this
to a social service representative or other counselor. The counselor
could then investigate why the child was not receiving at least
subsistence support. The CF would have to explain why the child was
not receiving ample support from the Child Investment Fund payment.
The excuse that there wasn't sufficient money, on its own, would no
longer be convincing. But the important point here is that if on a wide
spread basis, parents are using the Child Investment Fund to buy drugs
at the expense of their children's health and safety, we have a far larger
problem than the management of the cash assistance received. To the
extent an abuse exists regarding the Child Investment Funds in a rela-
tionship where the parent or guardian is otherwise a suitable guar-
200. Nancy M. Petry, Effects oflncreasingIncomeon Poydrug Use: A Comparison ofHeroi, Cocaine andAlcohol
Abusers, 95 ADDICTION 705, 705-17 (2000).
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dian,20 ' then either another CF would have to be chosen or the current
CF would have to receive the child benefit in voucher form.
b. Moral Hazard Dilemma
The second major criticism of this proposal is that the Child Invest-
ment Fund will impact the recipient's behavior in a socially inefficient
way. This is often referred to as a "moral hazard."
Moral hazard is a doctrine developed by the insurance industry to
define the potential changes in behavior when a person receives insur-
ance. For example, if a person has health insurance he may be more
willing to see a doctor even if he is not really sick. Health insurance
makes visiting the doctor less expensive, and a person may do so even
if the visit is inefficient in economic terms. Life insurance is another
classic example. A person with a very unhealthy lifestyle, or a person
thinking of suicide has a strong incentive to buy life insurance. The
insurance industry thus takes steps to minimize these "moral hazards"
by creating co-pays for health insurance or disallowing life insurance in
the case of suicide.20 2
In this context, some will raise the moral hazard rationale and claim
that providing investment in children will negatively impact parent's
behavior. It will encourage people to have children to receive the
benefit and will discourage work.20 3
On policy grounds, it is debatable whether in fact having children is
a moral hazard. The United States is currently below replacement level
fertility,2 4 and there is some evidence that the lack ofpopulation growth
201. For example, a parent with a gambling addiction might not be trustworthy with regard to the
child investment payment but might be a reasonable caregiver to the child.
202. For a discussion of the moral hazard doctrine and welfare, see McCluskey, supra note 5 1, at 807.
203. See LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZEN-
SHIP 41 (1986) (arguing that welfare makes recipients dependent upon govemment); CHARLES MURRAY,
LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980, at 147-66, 178-91 (1984) (arguing that welfare
hurts poor people by discouraging work, decreasing self-esteem and providing economic incentives for
failure); RANK, supra note 191, at 3 (discussing statements by politicians indicating that welfare encourages
children and referring to welfare recipients as "breeding factories."); CHARLES NOBLE, WELFARE AS WE
KNEW IT: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 126-27 (1997) (discussing argu-
ment that welfare encourages people to have children). Since the payment here belongs to the child not
the parent, it should not provide a significant incentive for CFs to quit work. In addition, any work
disincentives created by the Child Investment Funds might create social benefits, not harms. The Child
Investment Fund might make it more affordable for one parent to stay home.
204. The birthrate in 2002, 4,019,280 or approximately 13.9 per 1,000 ofpopulation, was the lowest
rate ever since national data has been available. Brady E. Hamilton et al., Births: Preliminary Datafor 2002,
NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS REP. (Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv.,
Hyatsville, Md.) June 25, 2003, at 1, availabk at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr5l/nvsr5l
-I 1 .pdf The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for 2002 was 2012.5 per 1,000, meaning that women over their
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can have economic consequences." 5 In fact, one problem with the
financial stability of the Social Security system is that there are not
enough workers to support the growing number of retirees. A growing
well-trained and well-educated workforce would likely benefit society,
not harm it.
But even if population growth is a moral hazard, there is little
likelihood that the program I propose will actually increase population
growth.2" 6 The $2,000 payment is significantly less than the cost to raise
a child, and it is very unlikely that someone will have a child just to
receive the benefit.2"' In economic terms, it is only those people whose
marginal cost for having children exceeds their marginal benefit by
$2,000 or less. Thus there are obviously some people who want to have
children, but believe that they cannot afford to do so. If the $2,000
payment is sufficient to make the next child affordable to them then that
couple's decision to have children may be impacted by the payment.
But from a societal perspective, there is really nothing wrong with
lifetime are currently having 2.01 children. Id at 3. The TFR has fallen 3% since 1990. Id. The United
Nations Population Division estimates that the average TFR will fall to 1,850 per 2,000 over the years
2045-2050. UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, POPULATION
DIVIsION, W,*tORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2002 REvISION: HIGHLIGHTS, U.N. Doc.
ESA/P/WP. 180, at4, availableathttp://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2 0 02 /WPP 2 0 0 2-
HIGHLIGHTSrevl.PDF. The Replacement Level Fertility (RLF), defined as the rate necessary for a
woman to replace herself and her partner, is set at 2.1 for industrialized societies. Id at 1. This number
is greater than two because of infant mortality. Thus, the current TFR in the United States is below
replacement level and long-term trends indicate that the rate is declining. Id.
205. See Geoffrey McNicoll, Economic Growth with Below-Replacement Ferati, 12 POPULATION AND
DEVELOPMENT REV. 217 (Supp. 1986) (recognizing that low fertility has only a slight impact on labor
supply, technological change, investment or consumption, but finding that low fertility potentially may have
a serious negative economic consequence due to distributional changes that will result from low fertility).
Butsee U.S. COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE, POPULATION AND
THE AMERICAN FUTURE: THE REPORT (1972); ThomasJ. Espenshade, Zero Population Growth and the
Economies ofDeveloping Nations, 4 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 645 (1972).
206. See, e.g., RANK, supra note 191, at 73-77 (finding no correlation between receipt of welfare
benefits and childbearing, and finding a negative correlation between long-term welfare receipt and
childbearing); BECKER, supra note 2, at 23 (economic growth and higher income does not appear to
increase birth rates). But see BECKER, FAMILY, supra note 9, at 139-40 (arguing that AFDC increased birth
rates).
207. The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that it costs $3,930 per year to
provide the basic necessities for a child. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 68 Fed. Reg. 6456
(February 7,2003). The Department of Agriculture estimates that, on average, families with incomes below
$39,700 and two children spend at least $6,620 per year per child. See LINO, supra note I1, at ii. For this
and other reasons, I strongly reject the notion that the payment should decrease if parents have more than
a certain number of children. As stressed throughout this Article, the child benefit here is the child's. The
child is in no way responsible for her own birth, and there is no basis for punishing the child for its
existence. In addition, such a policy makes no sense in this context because ultimately it is the child who
will be responsible for paying back the amount received. But see Foley, supra note 48, at 486 (proposing a
"personal allowance" for adults with children but capping the benefit at two per married couple).
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making it more affordable for this small group of parents to raise a
family.2 °8
Moreover, there is no evidence that other policy initiatives providing
benefits to families or children have increased fertility rates.2 9 Recently,
there have been very large increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit,
the Child Tax Credit, the Childcare Tax Credit, and the Dependency
Exemption, and there is no evidence that these policy initiatives have
had any impact on population growth.21 In addition, other indus-
trialized countries have family allowances and other benefits for families
that are far more generous than those in the United States and these
policies appear to have very little impact on fertility.2 1' Moreover,
pronatalist policies in Europe, which provide economic incentives to
families with children, have been found to have very little, if any, impact
on fertility."'
C. Is There Another Way?
I have presented my vision for a comprehensive program to increase
investment in children. Many people, however, are troubled by the
compulsory nature of the program. Upper-middle and upper-class
208. Since the payment at issue here is the child's, not the parent's, the payment may have less
impact on a parent's decision to have a child. But, if for example, parents were concerned about paying
for day care or college, the child benefit might lesson their concerns. Thus, the benefit might make raising
children more affordable and thus more attractive to some people on the margins.
209. In 7he Ideologp ofDvision, Lucy Williams refutes the common myth that welfare payments
encourage people to have children. Williams, supra note 11, at 737-41. She notes that the amount of
additional welfare benefits received by a parent for having an addition child is small, that a large majority
of welfare mothers have fewer than two children, and that differing welfare benefits among states do not
correlate to family size. Id. For example, Mississippi has the highest rate of families with four or more
children, yet the lowest AFDC payment. Maine and Vermont have very low percentages of families with
four our more children and have AFDC levels well above the national average. See id (citing U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FAMILY SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION, 1989 AFDC
RECIPIENT CHARACTERISTICS STUDY 24 (Table 6) (1991)); see also Kristin A. Moore & Steven B. Caldwell,
The Effect of Govmunent Policies on Out-of- Wedlock Sex and Prenmi,
, 
9 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 164,
164-69 (1977) (finding that AFDC was not an incentive for teens to have children).
210. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. In addition, the crude birth rate, defined as the
number of births per year per 1,000 people, has been declining 17% since 1990. Id. at 2; see also I NAT'L
CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEr. OF HEATH & HUMAN SERV., VITAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNrrEDSTATES, 1999,NATALITY, Table 1-1 (2001), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datawh/statab/unpubd/
natality/natab99.htm.
211. C. ALISON MCINTOSH, RECENT PRONATALIST POLICIES IN WESTERN EUROPE, 12
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW: BELOW-REPLACEMENT FERTILITY IN INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETIES: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, POLICIES 323 (Supp. 1986).
212. Paul Demeny, Pronatatist Policies in Low-Fertli v Counbies: Pattens, Peformance, and Prospects, in
BELOW-REPLACEMENT FERTILITYIN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, POLICIES 335,
350 (Kingsley Davis et al. eds., 1987) (indicating that the modal finding is that the effects of pronatalist
policies are nil or negligible).
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children may not be helped by this proposal. Children within these
socio-economic groups are already receiving sufficient investment in
their human capital.2"' In their situation, the child benefit becomes a
forced loan that the child must pay back. In addition, since higher-
income individuals usually invest heavily in their children, children from
higher income families often have higher incomes themselves. 214 A pay-
back that is based on income will likely require higher-income indivi-
duals to pay back more than "their share."
Despite the fact that some higher-income individuals may not receive
a dramatic benefit from the program, the benefits of a mandatory
program outweigh the fact that some higher-income individuals will
receive only a small benefit. Just as with Social Security, there is no
guarantee what will happen to any child, and no guarantee which
children will pay more and which less. Furthermore, as discussed
earlier, a broad-based program in which all children participate is
simpler to administer and less stigmatizing. There is, however, a way of
implementing this program on a voluntary basis.
First, the child's parent or guardian would elect before the child's first
birthday whether or not the child would participate in the program. At
the time, no parent or child knows how successful the child will be in
life. The parent or guardian would file a form, a CF would be appoint-
ed for the child, and the child would start receiving benefits. Just as
under the mandatory model, the child would be required to pay back
the funds as a percentage of income.
The program would work in the following manner. First, the govern-
ment would have to set a payback rate for participants. This payback
rate would have to be set based on the amount of benefit received, the
interest rate necessary for the payout and payback to reach equilibrium,
and a calculation of the risk that some participants will default. Since
the collection method here is through the Internal Revenue Code, it is
likely that there will be less risk of default than if this were a commercial
transaction. It is therefore likely that the risk premium and the interest
rate could be kept at a reasonable level. Once the payback rate was set
for a particular year, it would remain constant throughout the recipient's
life. The payback rate would have to be re-adjusted at reasonable
intervals. All children (through their parents) that chose to participate
would know the amount received and the payback rate at the time they
chose to receive the payment. Since collection of the paybackis through
the Internal Revenue Code, it would be easy to adjust the payback on
213. Seesupra note 35.
214. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of alternative proposals.
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a yearly basis. All people born from 2005-2006 could have a payback
rate of two percent, while people born from 2007-2008 might have a
payback rate of 1.8 percent. The payback rate would all depend on the
interest rates and risk factors that existed at the time participantsjoined
the program.
A second type of voluntary option would be a human capital loan.
This program would operate in a manner similar to the student loan
program. Parents could take out loans on behalf of their children for
human capital investment. Just as in the student loan program, the
government could guarantee private loans up to $2,000 a year for
human capital investment. The child would then be responsible for
paying back the loan once he or she started working. Unlike the other
investment proposals, in this proposal, the child would only be required
to pay back the amount he received plus interest. A successful child's
obligation would stop once the loan was retired. Conversely, an
unsuccessful child would continue to owe money regardless of his ability
to repay. Those that could not pay would default on the loan with the
commensurate consequences from default.
The loan option has several problems. First, if the government is
guaranteeing the loan, the program itself is not completely self-sup-
ported. If the government does not guarantee the loans, the loan rates
will be very high and paying the loan back might be very onerous.
Unlike in either the mandatory or voluntary program discussed above,
in the loan program children are on their own. Each child is only
responsible for paying back his particular loan. Since each child is only
paying back his or her loan, those who succeed will not be subsidizing
those who fail.2" 5 Moreover, absent a government subsidy, it is likely
that only low-income people will seek investment dollars through this
program since middle- and upper-income people will probably have
better methods of obtaining funds to invest in human capital. The result
is that the lower-income people seeking human capital loans will have
to pay high rates of interest, which may compound their already difficult
financial situation.
A government subsidized loan program might provide a sufficiently
attractive rate to make it a viable option. This, however, would require
a move away from the principle of revenue neutrality and towards one
of requiring at least a partial government subsidy. This in itself may be
appropriate if one believes that our allocation of resources needs to shift
to children away from other priorities.
215. Except to the extent they pay higher interest rates because ofthe risk of default. This could be
reduced by a guarantee on the part of the government, but that would require government subsidy of the
program.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Child Investment Fund proposal creates a self-sustaining
investment program in our children's human capital, and accomplishes
this task in a fiscally responsible way. A second goal of this proposal,
however, is to shift the focus away from punitive welfare policies
designed to punish parents who receive government assistance, to a
system that recognizes that children are the true beneficiaries of these
policies. A system that provides benefits directly to children helps
accomplish this task.
In a country with over 12 million children living in poverty, and with
middle-class families finding it harder to invest in their children, we
need to do more. To the extent we promote a social system where
people are required to sink or swim, we need to provide children with
the tools and resources to become great swimmers. It is simply too late
to throw them in the pool as adults and see what happens.
A system of human capital grants to children will help all children
learn to swim. The small cash allocation I propose may not be enough
to make all children Olympic swimmers, but it should provide a basis to
ensure that all of our children receive basic human capital investment
that is necessary for them to be self-supporting adults.
This proposal is not, in my view, the ideal way of addressing this issue,
and others have proposed far more grandiose programs," 6 but this is a
program that, at this point in time, is both politically and economically
feasible. We have been willing to place too much of a burden on our
children while spending resources on ourselves. It is time to reverse that
trend, and to make sure that all children can recognize their potential.
216. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of alternative proposals.
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APPENDIX
The following calculations are designed to provide general informa-
tion regarding the cost of this program. These figures represent when
a worker earning the median wage will pay back the amount he
received.
Payout Payback Inflation Interest Wage Payback
tax Growth Age
2,000 2% 3% 0% 1% 50
2,000 2% 3% 10% 1% 59
2,000 2% 3% 2% 1% Insufficient
2,000 2% 3% 0% 2% 48
2,000 2% 3% 1% 2% 55
2,000 2%0/ 3%0/ 2%0/ 20/0 Insufficient
Since everyone who participates in the program will not necessarily
be in the payback pool, I adjust the payback for labor force partici-
pation. Some will die, and others will chose not to work. In this regard,
I multiply the median wage by labor force participation rates by age
minus the unemployment rate. 7 In calculating the median wage, I use
the median wage by age provided by the Census Bureau. I then adjust
these figures to create a linear curve between age cohorts to create a
baseline median income. I then apply the wage growth figure in the
above table to that baseline.
These calculations are based on a very simplistic model and are
merely designed to show that an investment program similar to the one
I propose is financially responsible. The above calculations do not take
into account the fact that if this program is successful general revenues
to the Treasury will also rise.
217. The labor force participation rate measures the number ofpeople working or looking for work.
To determine the percentage of the labor force actually working, I subtract from the labor force
participation rate the percent of the labor force that is unemployed. The resulting number gives a ballpark
figure regarding how many people will be in the payback pool.
